The European Union must move beyond its reactive approach to dealing with the Russian Federation and adopt a robust, long-term strategy based on three key pillars: deterring Russian aggression against EU and NATO members, curbing Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine, and containing Moscow’s influence in EU candidate countries and the so-called Global South.
Commendable steps, but no strategy in sight
Since Russia launched its war against Ukraine, the EU has implemented policies to support Kyiv financially, politically and militarily. It has also unleashed policies aimed at bolstering Europe’s defence industry and countering Russia’s hybrid warfare campaigns with the report by the former Finnish president Sauli Niinistö outlining tools to enhance the EU’s resilience and readiness. While these are vital and highly commendable steps, they remain insufficient without a unified, strategic vision to counter the long-term threat posed by Russia.
The EU lacks a comprehensive strategy to address Russia's revisionism as the root cause of Moscow's behaviour. As Finnish President Alexander Stubb observed, the EU’s policy-making approach often follows a predictable cycle of crisis, chaos and suboptimal (and rather tactical) solutions. This reactive stance is inadequate to confront what is arguably Europe’s most urgent geopolitical challenge.
Russia’s revisionism & the EU’s blind spots
Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric and actions revealed his revisionist agenda. Putin’s worldview positions Russia as the defender of traditional values against what he perceives as the decadence of the West. His war on Ukraine, aimed at denying Kyiv separate national identity and its European future, is a violent manifestation of this ideology.
The inherent objective of current Russian foreign policy is to dissolve the post-Cold War security order in Europe rooted in the principles of the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which affirms every state's right to choose its own security arrangements. For years, key EU members, particularly Germany, France and Italy, underestimated Putin’s ambitions and ignored the revisionist tone in his speeches and writings, prioritising economic relations with Russia. The EU’s weak response to the war Russia waged against Georgia in 2008 and its initial aggression against Ukraine in 2014 failed to send a strong message of deterrence to Moscow.
Beyond Ukraine, Russia has escalated its covert warfare, targeting EU and NATO members through sabotage, disinformation campaigns, electoral interference, cyberattacks and assassination attempts. Moscow has shifted its economy to a wartime footing and recently revised its nuclear doctrine, significantly lowering the threshold for deploying nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear states. Recently, Putin announced plans for the mass production of the new intermediate-range ballistic missile, Oreshnik, which Russia has demonstratively used in Ukraine and which Belarus has requested to host on its territory. These actions are clearly designed to dissuade the EU and NATO from continuing their support for Kyiv.
From reactive to proactive foreign policy
While the EU has so far withstood Moscow's nuclear sabre-rattling and other threats, it still lacks a coherent long-term strategy to deter Russia’s revisionism – “the source of Moscow’s conduct”, to borrow from the phrasing of George Kennan, the architect of America’s containment policy, in his famous Long Telegram.
Europe must transition from short-term crisis management to a long-term strategy. Even if a ceasefire in Ukraine were achieved, the geopolitical landscape would not return to its state prior to February 2022. We live in a new world in which the EU must define its core interests vis-à-vis Russia and articulate a vision for achieving them.
As Madeleine Albright famously remarked, the objective of foreign policy is to influence other countries to act in ways that align with your interests. In this light, EU leaders must answer key questions: What do we want Russia to do (and not to do) in the short and long term? Which European interests must be protected and advanced?
Deterrence, defence and support for Ukraine
A robust strategy must rest on two pillars: deterrence and containment. In the short term, the EU's primary objective should be deterring Russia from launching aggression against any EU or NATO member state, or other European countries in its “near abroad” (Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, etc). To achieve this, the EU must bolster NATO’s deterrence and defence role. The new leadership at NATO and the newly appointed EU Defence Commissioner create a promising alignment to advance this agenda.
At the same time, the EU should aim to strengthen Ukraine on the battlefield so that it cannot be forced into a ceasefire under duress. Any agreement imposed against Ukraine's will would reward Russian aggression and embolden Putin to direct his ambitions toward other neighbours, the EU and NATO.
While politically sensitive, the EU must also prepare to resist any attempts by an incoming US administration to impose peace terms on Ukraine that lack robust and comprehensive security guarantees. A strong and united stance among EU member states is essential not only to uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty but also to prevent further destabilisation of European security.
Resilience at home, containment abroad
The EU must also deny Russia the ability to continue its campaign of sabotage and hybrid warfare against member states, including electoral interference and the disruption of undersea cables. The recently unveiled Niinistö Report offers promising recommendations to this end. However, as deterrence by denial can be costly and challenging, particularly in protecting underwater infrastructure, the EU should also foreground deterrence by punishment through severe sanctions and other punitive measures.
Containment should be an important element of the EU’s policies to confront Russia’s global networks. On the European continent, the EU must strengthen its efforts to counter Russian influence not only within its borders but also in candidate countries, as seen in Georgia and Moldova, albeit with differing outcomes. Externally, the EU should do more to counter Russia’s influence in the Global South. While this is easier said than done, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, a long-time Russian client, highlights Moscow's diminished capacity to protect its allies due to the strain of its war in Ukraine. This emerging power vacuum presents a strategic opportunity for the EU and its member states to position themselves as a more attractive partner to countries in the so-called Global South, thereby weakening Russia’s foothold in these regions. This would require Brussels to adopt a more pragmatic and flexible approach. For instance, it should no longer be conceivable for the EU to leave key countries like India without a free trade agreement for decades.
Russia’s internal turmoil and the China-Russia axis
In the long term, a critical open question is whether Europe should prepare for potential regime change in the Russian Federation. The current regime shows no signs of altering its hostility toward Ukraine and the West. It is also important to acknowledge that Russian society remains largely supportive of the war in Ukraine. Many young Russians, shaped by a state-controlled education system, have internalised bellicose rhetoric and harbour deeply ingrained hostility toward the West.
Therefore, even in the event of regime change, it is uncertain whether Russia’s revisionist foreign policy would fundamentally shift. Regardless of the regime's fate, the EU must be ready for all scenarios – whether it is confronting renewed aggression from Russia or dealing with its internal collapse and implosion, a less likely scenario given the Kremlin’s well-entrenched control mechanisms.
In addition to Russia’s internal developments, the EU’s Russia strategy faces an unavoidable challenge of the growing alliance between Moscow and Beijing under their so-called “partnership without limits.” Overwhelming evidence points to China supplying military material to Russia, rightly earning Beijing the label of a "strategic enabler" of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in NATO’s Washington Summit Declaration.
Yet, this partnership is not without differences. Several of Russia’s actions have put China in a difficult situation, notably Putin’s nuclear threats and, more recently, North Korea’s involvement in the war. Beijing’s nuanced objections in response to these moves showcase its desire to maintain some distance from Moscow’s most controversial moves.
For the EU, the main strategic objective is twofold: to disrupt and weaken the China-Russia axis and to prevent China from exerting influence over Europe’s security arrangements.
Crucial role of coalitions of the willing
Crafting and executing such a grand strategy will not be easy. The allure of the so-called "good old days," when Russia was regarded as a reliable partner and provider of “cheap” energy still lingers in several European capitals, notably Berlin. Complicating matters further, pro-Russian demagogues within the EU, such as Hungary's Viktor Orbán, Slovakia's Robert Fico, and Austria's Herbert Kickl, openly champion Moscow’s foreign policy agenda. Their sway, including the potential use of veto power, poses a significant obstacle to adopting more ambitious measures to counter Russia's revisionism.
Therefore, implementing such a strategy at the EU level will require coalitions of the willing. Countries most exposed to Russia’s covert warfare, particularly along NATO’s eastern and northern flanks, should lead strategic initiatives to counter Moscow’s malign activities while keeping them open to partners beyond the frontline. The early days of Russia’s war on Ukraine showed how such coalitions can drive broader EU action, as Central and Eastern European states took the lead in supplying military aid before the rest of Europe followed suit. Most recently, the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit has not only launched a mission to patrol the Baltic Sea and deter further attacks on undersea infrastructure but also outlined a set of model practices for protecting critical underwater installations, involving vessel inspections and even confiscations, calling on their EU and NATO partners to follow suit.
While the war in Ukraine has showcased the EU’s relative tactical agility, it also exposed its shortcomings as a strategist. If the EU seeks to be a serious global player, it must develop and implement a coherent strategy to counter its most significant threat. This is not only crucial for ensuring future European security but also for solidifying Europe’s standing on the global stage.
Juraj Majcin is a Policy Analyst on Defence and Security at the European Policy Centre.
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