Friedrich Merz, the lead candidate for chancellor of the conservative CDU/CSU, is predicted to emerge as the winner of the German federal elections on 23 February. Buoyed by this prospect but also facing pressure from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), polling in second place, Merz tabled a reform package before the German Bundestag in late January that foresaw a series of restrictions of migration policy. In addition to already announced permanent internal border controls, he sought a halt on family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and expanded police powers for the removal of those without permission to stay. Crucially, Merz relied on the support of the AfD to adopt his proposal. The legislation was ultimately voted down by a slim margin. Beyond considerably complicating future coalition talks with the Social Democrats (SPD) or the Greens, the creeping normalisation of far-right policy positions and the impact on EU policymaking should not be underestimated.
Maximalist, emergency-driven proposals like the suspension of access to asylum or border closures are largely symbolic and reflect positions held by far-right parties, in Germany and elsewhere. The result is that they normalise right-wing extremist positions, in discourse and policy. Merz’s move could further embolden right-wing parties in other European countries, with France’s National Rally and Austria’s Freedom Party already established as political forces to reckoned with.
Merz’s plans may also underdeliver. While drastic measures may convince voters at first sight, they risk only boosting support for the far right rather than delivering tangible changes. Moreover, the migratory challenges facing Europe – including governing migration flows – ultimately require European solutions, something he may quickly realise should he become Germany’s next chancellor.
By the same token, Merz’s manoeuvre demonstrates an increasingly common trend in European migration policymaking: a willingness to pursue unilateral actions, even if they go against EU law, in response to electoral gains by far-right, populist movements. For example, the imposition of permanent internal border closures and rejection of all asylum claims made at the national border undermine principles enshrined in the Schengen acquis, international refugee law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Echoing recent actions by Poland and Austria, the move suggests a shift from policymaking by consensus to “every man for himself”. These actions undermine trust among member states.
These dynamics will also complicate the second mandate of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. With Germany’s commitments to common EU rules more uncertain, other member states could follow suit. This will make the Commission’s job of ensuring compliance with EU laws much harder, after recent years have shown its reluctance to address violations, such as the repeated reintroduction of internal border controls. It also suggests that the implementation of recently adopted reforms under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and for the Schengen area, could struggle to obtain the necessary support in the face of national political priorities.
Helena Hahn is a policy analyst at the European Policy Centre.
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