Make the Franco-German engine great again?
Eric Maurice, Policy Analyst, European Politics and Institutions programme, European Policy Centre
In Paris, German elections are always closely watched, with the same question hovering around: will the Franco-German relationship improve under the next chancellor? With Friedrich Merz succeeding Olaf Scholz, the answer is a clear and hopeful “yes, because it could not get worse”.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Scholz never succeeded in overcoming their personal, political or strategic differences, and this Franco-German tandem never rose to the challenges of the Zeitenwende.
In contrast, Merz is seen in Paris as a Francophile who is willing to follow in the footsteps of chancellor Helmut Kohl’s , who resolutely engaged with France to take the EU forward in the 1980’s and 1990’s. During the campaign, Merz praised Macron’s dynamism and said he wanted to work closely with him. More fundamentally, he said he wanted to make Europe “independent” from the US and suggested readiness to accept EU spending on defence. At last, after decades of French preaching in the desert, a German leader seems to understand the need for genuine strategic autonomy and Europe-puissance.
This will be no easy ride, though. Disagreements between Macron and Merz have already come to light, such as over the EU trade deal with Mercosur, and others may appear over EU economic or energy policy. Even on defence and Ukraine, tensions are likely. France is not used to Germany being more assertive on geopolitics. Even assuming they will share the same conception of what “independence from the US” means, the two countries will need to reconcile their views and interests on issues such as EU funding for defence and conditions for it, defence industrial cooperation or security guarantees for Ukraine.
In this perilous moment for Europe, trust and political will may be back between Paris and Berlin. This is no longer sufficient, but it is still necessary. And time will be short before Macron leaves office in 2027. France and Germany need to show the way now.
What does Poland expect from Friedrich Merz?
Maria Skóra, Policy Fellow at Das Progressive Zentrum, and Research Fellow at the Institut für Europäische Politik
Friedrich Merz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk belong to the same political family of European centre-right Christian-democratic parties. The chancellor candidate visited Poland in December 2024 to discuss cooperation on defence, security, and supporting Ukraine. Poland was also mentioned five times in the CDU’s election manifesto: in the context of multilateral fora, security policy, and developing joint infrastructure, which signals the appetite for tightened bilateral relations. Seeing the unfavourable change in Washington, Merz understands the necessity to build coalitions in Europe and sees Poland as a bridge to Ukraine. In the current geopolitical context and with the new German focus on security in Europe, the revival of Polish-German cooperation is to be expected.
Regarding European policies, the Polish Presidency of the Council has outlined seven priorities, four of which focus on external security. This corresponds well with the plans set out by Merz to include Poland in the group of his closest allies. One platform to achieve this is a strengthened Weimar Triangle, another could be the heralded contact group for Ukraine, including Poland, the UK, France and Germany.
Another policy issue of concern is migration. The Polish government will seek to find a systemic solution at the EU level together with their German counterparts. Next, the Polish economy is tightly interwoven with Germany’s. Boosting competitiveness and reforming the German debt brake to make space for investments would be in the Polish interest.
Polish-German dialogue has recently been haunted by the recurring controversies around the Nazi atrocities committed in Poland during World War II. A future-oriented and forward-looking approach to bilateral relations would also encompass a sustainable settlement of the reparations and remembrance issue. A working group of Polish-German experts put forward the idea of revamping the interstate treaty between Poland and Germany, focusing on the common responsibility in Europe, which hopefully could rejuvenate, update and elevate the relationship between Warsaw and Belin.
What Ukraine expects from Merz’s Germany
Hennadiy Maksak, Executive Director, Ukrainian Prism
The elections in Germany were predictable in terms of determining the leader of the race, the CDU-CSU bloc. The formation of a grand coalition with the SPD could be both a positive and a negative development for Ukraine's expectations.
On the positive side, all the conditions are in place for a new government to be formed as early as April. On the other hand, a coalition with the SPD could become an obstacle to the progressive ideas that CDU leader Friedrich Merz expressed while in opposition and during the election campaign.
In general, Ukraine's expectations can be divided into several levels: bilateral, coalition, EU and NATO.
At the bilateral level, in line with his previously stated position, the new chancellor could be the leader who removes artificial obstacles to the supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine.
At the multilateral level, it is important for Ukraine that Berlin remains a driver of the capability coalitions established by EU and NATO member states to strengthen the country's defence capabilities. In particular Germany, together with France, leads the coalition air and missile defence.
During the election campaign, Merz also spoke of the need to create a new alliance of Ukraine's key European allies to develop a common vision of future peace in Ukraine, which could have a positive impact on the dynamics of building an effective, inclusive negotiating architecture.
At the NATO level, Merz, in complete contrast to the outgoing chancellor Olaf Scholz, supported the possibility of Ukraine's accession to NATO and the need to keep this issue on the agenda. Ukraine needs the votes of its European allies to exert political pressure on the opponents of Ukraine's accession to the Alliance.
A difficult balance to find for Italy
Nicoletta Pirozzi, Head of Programme on European Union, Istituto Affari Internazionali
The results of the German elections will allow the Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU) to form a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and this should guarantee greater stability and resolve to the German government. At the European level, the CDU/CSU’s strong result further confirms the conservative leadership of the EU, through the European People’s Party (EPP), but the alignment of the German government with the EU agenda will also depend on the relationship of the new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, with Ursula von der Leyen at the European Commission and Manfred Weber, the EPP group leader in the European Parliament.
The first declarations by Merz seem to confirm his intention to work in particular with France and Poland – the so-called Weimar triangle – to relaunch Germany’s European agenda. This might frustrate the ambitions of Italy, which traditionally sees itself as the third leg of the Franco-German engine.
The change of government in Germany and the shift towards the right certified by the latest elections might play in favour of an enhanced cooperation between the Italian and German governments, especially on security and competitiveness, with a focus on migration and the automotive industry. But the European positions of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Merz are still quite different. While Merz was unambiguous in his declarations when it comes to the choice between Europe and the US, underlying the need for European autonomy, Meloni is still finding a difficult balance between the transatlantic bond and European unity.
These analyses were developed during our online event “European perspectives on Germany’s federal elections”
Available to watch again here.