With its proposal for a Return Regulation, the European Commission aims to facilitate returns and harmonise standards and practices. But bold and controversial ideas like ‘return hubs’ have already sparked heated debate, overshadowing core elements of the proposed reform and key political questions. Will ambition prevail, or will the EU face more fragmentation?
The European Commission pledged to deliver a “a new common approach on the return of irregular migrants” within the first 100 days of its new mandate. With this deadline looming, on 11 March 2025 it proposed to replace the current Return Directive with a Regulation. The proposal follows calls by the European Council to put forward “as a matter of urgency” measures to “facilitate, increase and speed up returns”.
The return framework has a contentious history: early commentators labelled the original framework, which the Commission is now aiming to replace, the “Shame Directive”. Yet others have shown that it has, over time, strengthened safeguards for irregularly staying non-EU nationals.
The Commission’s reform proposal seeks to tighten the existing rules further, through measures including stricter procedures, stronger sanctions to incentivise cooperation of irregularly staying persons as well as mandatory mutual recognition of return decisions. Yet, what attracted the greatest attention are ‘return hubs’. In response to calls for ‘innovative solutions’, the reform would make it possible for member states to remove irregularly staying non-EU nationals to any third country they wish, subject to an “agreement” or “arrangement”, compliance with human rights and a monitoring mechanism.
Civil society reactions to the proposal were predictably negative, accusing the Commission of yielding to the “unworkable, expensive and inhumane demands of a few shrill anti-human rights and anti-migration governments” and rejecting hubs as “expensive, cruel and illegal”. Liberal MEPs called the approach “populist,” while those from the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group pledged to oppose any text containing hubs. EU Commissioners and MEPs from the European People’s Party (EPP) defended the hubs and argued that the proposed measures are necessary to show voters they have “put the European house in order”.
Despite dominating discussions, return hubs are not a key feature of the new “common approach”. Instead, they can be seen as yet another instance of ‘non-Europe’ in migration policy – as the initiative would lie entirely with member states – and may never see the light of the day due to political, legal and financial obstacles.
Besides polarising the debate, the disproportionate attention generated by the hubs also risks overshadowing other elements in the Commission’s proposal, and the key question of whether these would help turn the common EU return system into a reality. It also distracts from key practical and political considerations, including the resources needed to ensure the reform’s implementation, and its coherence with the updated rules governing the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the Schengen area.
Regulating ambition: Strengthening the return framework or slowing negotiations?
Though opinions on the reform differ, most stakeholders agree that the current return system has systemic deficiencies. EU and member state representatives typically lay emphasis on the low number of actual departures (i.e. ‘return rates’) using this as an overall indicator of effectiveness. This continues to draw criticism from civil society and other commentators. Meanwhile, recent violent attacks in Germany and France by non-EU nationals who had been ordered to leave also led to higher pressure to introduce stricter security measures.
Still, there are many more shortcomings in the current framework. Different approaches to transposition and implementation have led to divergent practices across the Union, with decisions by national courts widening gaps. This undercuts predictability, as similar cases can lead to different outcomes in different member states.
Meanwhile, rulings by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) have identified major ambiguities in the Directive, requiring an upgrade to the rules to avoid inconsistencies.
The current framework also falls short on procedural safeguards and fundamental rights. Although detention should be a measure of last resort – with alternatives also foreseen under the current framework – authorities often use it systematically. Since the Directive does not specify time limits, some member states have set short deadlines for lodging appeals, affecting the right to an effective remedy, while others maintained longer ones. Monitoring obligations are not specified. Furthermore, states may, but are not obliged to, grant rights to stay to those who cannot be returned, leaving many in legal limbo.
It comes as no surprise, then, that the EU return system is generally seen as insufficient and fragmented, with inconsistencies worsened by “suboptimal” cooperation with third countries.
Another reason for upgrading the current rules is their interaction with the newly adopted New Pact and Schengen reforms, to avoid discrepancies and legal uncertainty.
Expecting the Commission to ignore political priorities and legal or practical shortcomings in this context is not only unrealistic but also counterproductive. Rather than dismiss or embrace the reform outright, or focus on individual elements like return hubs, stakeholders should engage with all parts of the proposal, examining whether it closes current gaps.
Toward a common system: Mutual recognition and the creation of an EU return space
As it aims to create a common EU return system, the main question is whether the Commission’s proposal moves closer to that objective than the current framework. Helpfully, the proposed Regulation itself identifies key components of such a common system: (a) a common procedure; (b) mandatory recognition of return decisions issued by other states; (c) an adequately resourced return system with trained personnel; (d) proper integration with digital systems; (e) effective cooperation between states; and (f) support from EU agencies.
Though further EPC analysis will follow on these aspects, mutual recognition, procedural rules, as well as cooperation with third countries merit more immediate attention.
To begin with, the Regulation makes it mandatory to recognise a return decision issued by another member state. Currently optional – and seldom used – mandatory mutual recognition represents a clear push for a ‘seamless return process’, establishing that the same decision must have effects across the whole of the EU. Member states would only be able to avoid recognition of a foreign return decision on “public policy” grounds or if the country of return differs from that in the original decision.
If adopted by the Council and Parliament, mandatory mutual recognition would imply a significant change in practice for many national administrations that typically issue new decisions, among others, because of concerns over accountability for decisions made by other states and the heavier administrative burden that recognition sometimes implies. Procedural safeguards are also likely going to take centre stage during the negotiations.
The Commission’s proposal expands detention grounds and increases the maximum detention period. It also sets time limits for appeals. While these provisions could avoid divergent practices, combined with the limited automatic suspensive effect of appeals, they have already attracted criticism due to concerns over weakened procedural guarantees. The proposed Regulation also defines special rules for individuals posing a security risk, aiming to speed up their removal.
On cooperation with third countries, the proposal seeks “to ensure their authorities’ collaboration through obligations, incentives, and consequences for non-cooperation”. Yet measures like visa sanctions or trade lie outside the scope of the return framework. This raises the question of how to ensure coherence of the return framework with other actions pursued by the Union: without effective cooperation from third countries, the number of returns will remain low. This problem is well known, but the risk of damaging relations with third countries in a context of greater geopolitical tensions demands an especially cautious approach.
A further gap concerns the situation of those who cannot be returned, which the Regulation does not directly tackle. This raises the risk of unequal treatment and potential abuse, due to the vulnerability of people in limbo, other than the prospect of their secondary movements due to disparities in living conditions.
From policy to practice: Implementation and political challenges ahead
Given its political urgency, the comprehensive approach put forward, and the need for well-prepared national administrations and EU agencies, the co-legislators are expected to soon start the proposal’s negotiations. Any significant delay could call into question the strategy of accelerating the presentation of the proposal to the first 100 days in office of the new Commission.
Relatedly, the Commission faced a tough dilemma in deciding what kind of instrument to put forward: either pursue a much-awaited, needs-based reform, with greater chances of faster negotiations, or adopt a more political approach, also risking protracted discussions within and between the Council and Parliament.
Connected to this, while the Polish Council Presidency regards the reform as a top priority, experience with the Pact reforms shows that member states’ support may be hard to win, even with security-oriented proposals. For its part, the Parliament will be under significant pressure to move ahead with the reform, after failing to adopt a common position on the previous proposal.
While it remains to be seen if and how fast an agreement will be reached between the co-legislators, three challenges and urgent goals are already apparent, with effects beyond return.
First, as states have already taken steps toward implementing the New Pact and CEAS reforms adopted before summer, the negotiations could be an opportunity to ensure that a future EU return system follows a clear implementation agenda. Remarkably, the proposal contains few details on implementation or monitoring, nor does it explain how its negotiation and possible adoption will affect the Pact preparations, where return is a building block.
Second, each of the recently adopted as well as prospective reforms would follow a different schedule, with new Schengen rules already applicable, the New Pact reforms from mid-2026. Some parts of the return reform are applicable immediately after the text is adopted, others later on – to give time to devise operational measures. These multiple timelines could create confusion for national administrations that will have to navigate and apply constantly changing rules.
Third, Poland’s contradictory stance on migration reforms remains a glaring issue. Despite voting against the New Pact, begrudgingly filing a national plan, and refusing to fulfil key obligations, it will now strive to lead on maximising returns. Until Poland, alongside other EU countries with a similar stance, reconciles its contradictory positions, it risks undermining both its own credibility and the integrity of the Union’s migration framework. Such positioning suggests that member states can pick and choose with impunity the CEAS elements they prefer, while Europe heads towards a migration policy ‘à la carte’.
Author’s note: As EPC participated in the Study informing the Commission’s reform proposal, this commentary limits itself to general observations, with more detailed analysis to follow in the coming months.
Alberto-Horst Neidhardt is Senior Policy Analyst and Head of the European Migration and Diversity programme
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