After some last-minute drama, including Commissioner Breton resigning acrimoniously, the set-up of the new von der Leyen Commission has been announced, and the portfolio allocation and mission letters have been revealed. Subject to the last-minute discussions in Slovenia and, of course, the hearings in the European Parliament, this gives us a much better indication of the direction of travel.
Overall, Commission President von der Leyen has got much of what she wanted. Yes, gender balance has not been achieved (60:40 in favour of males) but it looks better than at the outset and the top leadership is largely female, with five of the seven top leadership positions – including the Commission President, the four Executive Vice-Presidents, and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy – all being women. Yet, much work remains to make the Commission reflect better the diversity of Europe’s population, along all its dimensions.
A number of portfolios have been rejigged to reflect the new priorities of this mandate, putting a much greater emphasis on (economic) security/defence and competitiveness. But there are also some points worth noting, where there are potential difficulties in delivering the objectives in the next mandate, building on our analysis:
More than ever, there are a plethora of cross-cutting themes and overlaps between portfolios. This structure further strengthens the role of the Commission President in the new construction but also increases the risk of bottlenecks. It will also have to be clear who has the authority to take the policy forward, which is linked to the enhanced role of the Executive Vice-Presidents: do they have effective authority over a cluster of Commissioners and how are trade-offs and synergies between clusters addressed (for example, the role of defence and security in enhancing the EU’s industrial competitiveness)? In this context, the portfolio of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms does not seem well integrated into the overall structure, and does not appear well adapted to the new challenges the EU faces.
There will have to be new and innovative ways to deliver the key priorities, together with the member states, so the need for structural innovations, as well as differentiated integration inside or outside the EU treaties remains strong.
There is reference to the implementation of the Draghi, Letta and Niinistö reports, but delivery would have been aided by a greater prioritisation and concretisation of exactly what will be taken forward in the first instance (e.g. the Capital Markets Union?) and by whom, especially given the manifold political trade-offs that still have to be clarified when implementing the new Commission’s programme.
Some horizontal themes could have been highlighted strongly across all portfolios, asking each Commissioner in their mandate to take forward concrete actions to contribute to overarching goals. For instance, addressing the implications of the watershed moment of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including enlargement or the need for Europe to greatly accelerate technology investment, development and adaptation to enhance competitiveness and accelerate the necessary transitions, as well as reduce dependencies, could have been stronger.
While there is a Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, this does not reflect the need to take an intergenerational approach across all policy areas.
The allocation of economic security to the trade portfolio, asking to develop a new Doctrine, might be too narrow if only focused on trade. Economic security is a broader concept that cuts across all economic portfolios and should influence most policy fields (for instance, in skills, there is a need to recognise that critical human resources and skills are as important for security as critical raw materials).
The allocation of health and the pairing with animal health downgrades this policy area, which might prove to be unwise, given the links to competitiveness (biotech, pharmaceuticals), the challenges we are already facing, including the demographic transition and its implications for an ageing population and the (health) workforce, and the possibility of future challenges, for instance, new pandemics.
Foresight has effectively been downgraded, dropped from the portfolio names and allocated far from the centre of power. This is shortsighted, the tools and resources in this field could have been activated to assist the Commission President far more effectively.
While the general part of the Mission Letters argues that the Commission will “start a new era of dialogue with citizens”, this is not specifically spelt out in the roles assigned to the Executive Vice-Presidents and other Commissioners. If the new von der Leyen Commission wants to embed citizen participation in its work (as it postulates), this should have been better mirrored in the Commission structure and in the role of at least one of the Executive Vice-Presidents.
The objective and need to substantially improve EU governance in light of the manifold internal and external challenges, as well as a potential enlargement to 30+ member states, is not reflected in the new Commission structure. It is neither mentioned strongly in the general part of the Mission Letters nor is it clearly reflected in the assignment of key portfolios. This is another strong indication that EU governance reform, not excluding also a potential amendment of the Union’s primary law, is not a key priority of the second von der Leyen Commission.
The fact that key Commission portfolios related to security and defence as well as enlargement are filled with candidates originating from Central, Eastern and Northern Europe, Henna Virkkunen (FIN), Kaja Kallas (EST), Andrius Kubilius (LIT), Marta Kos (SLO) is a clear indication that the political necessities deriving from the new era (Zeitenwende) we live in are strongly reflected in the composition of the new Commission. However, it is by no means certain that the EU27 will be politically willing and able to support a substantially higher level of political ambition when it comes to living up to the radical change we are experiencing. If agreement cannot be found within the existing EU framework, an alternative route needs to be explored. The countries that are ready to deepen their level of cooperation should do so, even if parallel avenues extend beyond the narrow legal confines of the current EU treaties.
Ultimately, making decisive progress to overcome the progress illusion will be the biggest challenge. This will, largely, not be in the hands of the Commission, but in what member states will allow to happen at the EU level. The signs so far are not good, with inertia settling in. Maybe only another major and acute crisis, for instance, the re-election of Trump, can shake the member states up sufficiently to not only pay lip service to the need to act.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre.
Janis A. Emmanouilidis is Deputy Chief Executive and Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre.
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