As August fades into September, historians and experts remain watchful since so many crises have begun in the heat of a waning Summer. These include the First World War, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, and the 2007 credit crunch. Whether such events await us in the coming days remains unlikely but the same cannot be said of the coming 12 months. The question is, will Europe be ready?
The new European Commission is starting to emerge, and new officials are being nominated as “appointments season” consumes the attention of EU leaders. At the same time, Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine grinds on while its hybrid attacks against Europe are picking up pace.
In 2024 alone, thousands of Russia-linked social media accounts spread disinformation to disrupt and influence European parliamentary elections with false stories and deepfakes. Russia has reignited border disputes in the Baltic region while jamming GPS signals needed for safe passage of air and maritime transportation. Railway and communications cables have been cut in Germany and France, while Estonia experienced its worst cyberattacks since 2007 by the Russian hacker group Killnet.
Since 2023, undersea cables have been severed, including the Euroconnector between Finland and Estonia (by a Chinese commercial vessel) and in Norway by Russian fishing trawlers.
Russian saboteurs have been arrested in France, UK, Germany, and Poland, and Russia is suspected of recent attacks and probing of Finland, Germany, and Sweden’s water, communications, and health systems. Meanwhile, Russian dissidents have been assassinated in Spain, Lithuania, and Germany, while Russian disinformation has supported and enabled far-right race riots in the United Kingdom. According to some observers, Russia already sees itself at war with Europe.
Despite Ukraine’s assault on Russia’s Kursk region and the disruptions it caused within Russia, Kyiv has seen an increase in attacks on population centres and critical infrastructure this year. Europe’s failure to meet ammunition aid targets and a six-month gap in US assistance due to Republican obstruction in Congress left Ukraine with critical shortages at the end of 2023 and early 2024.
These events are occurring against a backdrop of unprecedented Western financial and material support for Ukraine at a time when Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, former UK Army chief General Sir Patrick Sanders, and historian Philip Zelikow have been warning Europe of a possible conflict with Russia within three years. Even if Russia is defeated in Ukraine, Moscow’s remaining nuclear capabilities and resentment from such a humiliation could turn it into a North Korea on the Volga.
While Europe’s new medium-term defence programs are aimed at being prepared by the end of this three-year time window, Europeans must also be ready to navigate a potentially perilous next 12 months.
The first pivotal event is the November US presidential election between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Either scenario might leave Europe in a difficult position. If Trump wins, both he and vice-presidential candidate JD Vance have stated they will cut off US aid to Ukraine, leaving Europe holding the bag. They’ve also indicated they may not honour NATO’s Article 5 if a European ally is attacked, potentially leaving Europe to fend for itself if Russia decides to attack.
If Harris wins but her Democratic party does not win control of the US Congress, Republicans could further block, delay, or disrupt aid to Ukraine, leading to the same outcome. Since Trump and some of his party leaders have suggested they would not accept the result if Harris won, the time window from November to January could see another Trump-led coup attempt. This time, instead of relying on violence, it could play out in the courts and statehouses where Republicans have been making preparations for just such a scenario since 2021.
In this case, if the United States is distracted by an existential threat to its democracy, it could be a less than reliable partner for Europe and Ukraine in the short-term, even if Harris prevails. So, from January to July 2025, Europe could be left as Ukraine’s sole supporter as the war enters its fourth year, a time when Europe is also busy rearming itself.
In this scenario, the EU, UK, and Norway could find it necessary to converge on defence and security matters to a degree not seen since Brexit.
So, how can a whole-of-Europe be prepared?
Firstly, Europe must respond to Russia’s hybrid campaign collectively. In recent years, EU member states have largely responded nationally, but not collectively, in the face of too many hybrid incidents. We forfeit Europe’s collective advantage when we allow this to happen repeatedly.
Mechanisms to support Ukraine face blockages on both sides of the Atlantic and Europe must address this issue effectively before the end of 2024, lest the EU’s support to Ukraine be endlessly disrupted by recalcitrant member states like Hungary. While a Trump loss in November could leave Hungary more politically isolated and easier to deal with, the EU cannot leave its fate in the hands of US voters and the outcome of any ensuing efforts by Trump to overturn the election.
Secondly, the EU must continue to support Ukraine with an emphasis on a strong defence and deep strikes in 2025 to attrit and weaken Russia’s ability to sustain the fight. Emphasis should be placed on providing more air defence systems to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Given the ranges of modern air defence systems, European militaries may consider placing some of their units in key locations on its eastern borders to help defend Western Ukraine against Russian cruise missiles. Since they are launched from standoff range, the chances that any of these units might shoot down a Russian aircraft are remote.
Some countries may even choose to commit air defence units to Odessa or Lviv to free up Ukrainian air defence systems to better provide coverage elsewhere.
Thirdly, we must understand the current crisis is global and not confined to Europe. In a globalised world, every war is global. This means that countries like Iran, which supplies Russia with the Shahed drones that are terrorizing Ukrainian cities, must face the same sanctions and punitive isolation as Russia. Examining China’s support for the Russian war effort could also lead to a tightening of restrictions on trade and technology transfer.
Next, Europe must adapt and accelerate its program to build long-term deterrence with robust, capable, and effective forces that are well supported by a strong logistics system with ample supplies of ammunition, spare parts, and technicians to repair systems. At the very least, given the three-year time window senior experts have given us, there should be no backsliding on commitments to fund European defence.
Finally, for Europe to navigate these perilous times, it must be able to shift from individual national responses to collective responses with enough speed to shape outcomes. While Europe is updating its defence and security hardware, it can only achieve an effective collective response with updated decision-making software.
According to one EU official, “We’re behind the curve because we often don’t even see the curve. And even when we do, we’re too slow to change anything.”
One way to change this is to establish a strategic body to formulate collective options and coordinate EU responses to security challenges: a Security Council mechanism. This body would integrate sensing, sense-making, planning, coordination, and the rapid development of strategic options for member states to decide on. It would also coordinate positions and responses from member states and monitor their implementation.
This body would not reduce member states’ influence and decision-making autonomy but rather enable and speed up their ability to agree on and implement collective action, enabling the EU to better shape outcomes.
To be truly effective, such a policy machine would need to be supported by a more robust and capable EU Intelligence Centre with an expanded mandate to monitor, analyse, and provide predictive intelligence products toward achieving collective situational awareness and anticipation.
Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a senior visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre.
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