India will continue to practice a cautious – and at times ambivalent - policy of neutrality to balance its complex global relationships and aspirations.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Ukraine was as much about restoring his image in the West as promoting peace, dialogue, and improving ties with Kyiv. While a new chapter in India-Ukraine relations may have opened, Russia will remain a crucial, time-tested ally for New Delhi.
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, India’s national interests have dictated what New Delhi claims to be a neutral position. It has carefully balanced its relationship with Russia - a crucial energy and arms supplier – recognising that alienating Moscow could harm its security vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, while also maintaining good relations with its partners in the West as part of India’s ‘multi-aligned’ foreign policy. This sees India participate in various global and regional formats – including BRICS, the SCO, and the Quad - as a way to enhance New Delhi’s security, regional and global footprint.
Yet, India’s repeated abstentions from voting on UN resolutions condemning Russia’s illegal invasion have sparked concerns and criticism from several Western countries. While this stance has frustrated its Western partners, they have largely tolerated it, worried about pushing India closer to Moscow or jeopardising their relationship with a country that is becoming increasingly influential in economic, security, and global affairs. To navigate the complexity of India’s ‘strategic neutrality’, the US and Europe have also exercised a degree of ‘strategic patience’ in response to their geopolitical priorities. For example, India’s role in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy is essential in balancing China’s growing regional influence.
However, Modi’s visit to Russia on 8 July 2024 marked a significant blow to this delicate balance. While the Prime Minister was hugging Putin and calling him a “dear friend”, Russia launched a devastating missile attack on the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv. Unprecedented criticism of Modi by Ukraine and India’s Western partners followed, including Washington and the EU. Against this background, Modi’s planned visit to Poland and Ukraine (the first by an Indian Prime Minister in Ukraine’s history) took on greater importance.
Recalibrating India’s position
India's ties with Russia and Ukraine are at different levels. While India has a deeply rooted strategic partnership with Russia, Ukraine’s is limited. However, not wanting to be perceived as part of the anti-US block, New Delhi’s goal was to recalibrate its approach to the war. Still, while Modi warmly hugged President Zelenskiy, and emphasised the need for peace, dialogue, and a ceasefire, he did not denounce Russia’s invasion. Yet, it was far from an empty visit, which came on the eve of Ukraine’s Independence Day. The final communiqué emphasises the mutual interest in “elevating bilateral relations from a comprehensive partnership to a strategic partnership in the future.” This includes boosting political and economic cooperation and plans to work towards stronger defence ties, including through collaborations and partnerships. Both sides have decided to host the second meeting of the Indian-Ukrainian Joint Working Group on Military-Technical Cooperation in India. This also reflects India’s goal of diversifying defence cooperation. In addition, four agreements were signed in the areas of agriculture and the food industry, medicine, culture and humanitarian assistance. The two sides also discussed India’s potential role in Ukraine’s reconstruction. Developing a roadmap to take these issues forward and keep the positive dynamic alive is crucial. Modi also invited Zelenskiy to visit India, which would be an important step in building on the Prime Minister’s visit to Ukraine.
The communiqué also calls for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet, while Modi’s support for the UN Charter principles is important, there is little to indicate he will do more than – as the Prime Minister underlined – act as a messenger between Kyiv and Moscow. However, the fact that India so far, unlike China and other countries, has not come up with its own peace plan is significant as such efforts are counter-productive to the peace process.
The extent to which India will deepen its involvement in President Zelenskiy’s Peace Formula (PF) will serve as an important indicator to assess if Modi’s visit is more than just a public relations stunt. Until now, India has not actively engaged in the PF, sending a low-ranking official to the May Peace Summit in Switzerland and refraining from endorsing the final communiqué. Zelenskiy’s call for India to host the next summit has so far not been accepted and it is unlikely to be as long as Russia is not involved. While securing high-level Indian participation at the next Peace Summit, which is scheduled to take place later this year, is a key objective of President Zelenskiy, India’s insistence that Russia is invited is likely to remain an impediment. Nevertheless, India could still step up its engagement in the different working groups linked to the PF as well as take on a bigger role in some key issues, such as helping facilitate the return of abducted Ukrainian children. Since the war began, Russia has forcibly abducted some 20.000 children and deported them to Russia. Steps in this direction will be a litmus test for New Delhi’s approach to the war.
For Ukraine, the visit carried political weight and global optics, as it underscored Ukraine’s deepening engagement with non-Western nations, which is a strategic priority for Kyiv.
India will continue to follow its own interests
Realistically, there is little chance of New Delhi seriously downgrading ties with Moscow, not least due to economic and security considerations that the West is either unable or unready to address. Moscow’s deepening ties with Beijing have sparked significant security concerns for New Delhi, which is worried that a more isolated Russia may be driven further into China’s orbit. However, India’s gradual reduction of arms imports from Russia in recent years underscores a broader strategy to reduce dependency and establish New Delhi as an independent actor on the world stage. Neutrality and independence are considered as two factors enabling India to engage with a diverse range of countries and blocs without being tied up or constrained by any single alliance or actor, thereby preserving its strategic autonomy. India’s neutrality should be seen as a product of cold calculations. In a world engaged in a rebalancing process, it allows India to maintain its relevance as the ‘Voice of the Global South’ and leverage by appealing to countries that are dissatisfied with the hypocrisy/double standards of the West, or prefer avoiding taking sides on the war.
Currently, India has little immediate incentive to alter its stance, Ukraine’s allies in the West, particularly the EU, and the US, should continue to support the burgeoning Ukraine-India relationship and any sincere efforts by India to contribute to ending the war. However, they should also recognise that while ties with Ukraine may improve, India is unlikely to jeopardise its relationship with Russia. Modi’s call with President Joe Biden and then with President Vladimir Putin – where they discussed how to strengthen their Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership - less than a week after his meeting with Zelenskiy, underscore India’s diplomatic strategy. India will remain a neutral party, advocating for peace without fully committing to any side or acting as mediator. It will continue to practice a cautious – and at times ambivalent - neutrality policy to balance its complex global relationship and aspirations.
Amanda Paul is a Senior Policy Analyst and Deputy Head of the Europe in the World Programme at the EPC.
Ivano di Carlo is a Senior Policy Analyst in the Europe in the World Programme at the European Policy Centre.
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This commentary is part of the Ukraine's European Future project.
