As Europe navigates a period of significant global geopolitical transformation and rising illiberalism, the foundational principles of our democratic societies face unprecedented challenges. Civil society organisations (CSOs) across the continent must withstand immense pressures, ranging from growing funding constraints to increasingly hostile environments. The European Union (EU) needs to step in and provide short-term relief as well as a long-term strategy to strengthen the sector’s capacity. At the same time, civil society actors themselves need to build new alliances in order to more effectively safeguard our liberal democratic foundations, before anti-democratic forces undermine them from within.
A challenging environment
Democracy and the rule of law in Europe are under growing pressure as they are increasingly framed as political matters rather than as fundamental principles. The speech of US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference should be a wake-up call for all those who remain reluctant to believe that the Trump administration opposes liberal democracy in Europe.
At the same time, nationalist governments and authoritarian populists within Europe are exploiting these challenging times of permacrisis, by stacking electoral support and undermining democratic principles. Political pressures and competing priorities further strain the EU’s capacity to uphold its foundational values. Now more than ever, the EU needs to double down on its efforts to safeguard the key principles of democracy and the rule of law in Europe.
Funding gap
As the actual significance of the work done by CSOs grows, they face new challenges. The USAID funding stop already presents an existential threat to the survival of many organisations. This is further exacerbated by funding reductions from national governments and resource constraints related to the changing priorities of philanthropic institutions. This situation calls for innovative approaches to sustain resources and support for the work of CSOs in Europe.
In addition, CSOs confront increasingly complex political environments. In some countries they face public criticism, disinformation and increasing administrative hurdles. For example, the Serbian government recently announced a new Law on the Special Register of Agents of Foreign Influence and then began investigating NGOs that were receiving USAID funding. This is only the latest example of how rule of law defenders can be unfairly characterised due to their work supporting fundamental rights in an increasingly illiberal environment.
The systemic political demonisation of CSOs is a growing trend across EUrope. Governments are increasingly weaponising narratives of "foreign interference" and political neutrality to undermine the critical work of civil society organisations. In Germany, this is exemplified by the CDU's recent attempts to scrutinise the political affiliations of NGOs receiving state funding after these organisations participated in demonstrations against the party's indirect collaboration with the AfD in the Bundestag. By questioning the legitimacy of these organisations' advocacy work, such tactics aim to create a chilling effect on civil society activism. Similarly, at the EU level, the Commission's decision to restrict environmental CSOs from receiving funding for advocacy work represents another alarming instance of institutional pressure. These efforts – ranging from public questioning of CSO funding sources to bureaucratic restrictions – constitute a sophisticated strategy of marginalising civil society actors. Smear campaigns, administrative hurdles, and funding constraints are being deployed to silence critical voices, effectively narrowing the space for democratic dialogue and independent civic engagement.
A path forward
In response to the shrinking space for civil society across the continent, EUrope needs to step up decisively and fast – and doubly so because there is no one else left to fill the void created by the new US administration.
First and foremost, the EU needs to address urgent short-term needs of European civil society. This starts with ensuring the immediate survival of these organisations by filling the funding hole recent cuts have created. Beyond European and national institutions, philanthropic and private actors also need to step in. Furthermore, the EU needs to develop effective protection mechanisms for CSOs facing attacks by governmental bodies or smear campaigns, whether from external or internal sources. This would strengthen the ecosystem of democracy defenders. Initiatives such as the EU System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society are positive examples of monitoring which data can be used to draft concrete action plans for protection. Furthermore, the Anti-SLAPP regulation for journalists and media could inspire similar defence mechanisms for human and fundamental rights defenders.
Second, the EU needs to elaborate a long-term strategy for civil society. The recently announced Civil Society Strategy is a crucial element in achieving this. But the Commission needs to get the fundamentals right, so that the strategy can have a lasting impact. For example, it should develop a protection mechanism against political demonisation, 'foreign agents' regulations and smear campaigns against CSOs. The strategy needs to contain elements that ensure funding for advocacy work by CSOs to maintain an open dialogue. This should also be reflected in the negotiations on the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The strategy also needs to link to the Commission’s Rule of Law Reports, which should include a chapter on the state of CSOs in a more systematic fashion to ensure attention and early detection of the deterioration of civic space. Both the Civil Society Strategy and the European Democracy Shield will only be effective once the EU acknowledges the threats to democracy coming from within.
Finally, there is a need for transversal and transnational solidarity – in funding, alliances, and diversification of financial support. Civil society needs to work together more closely across Europe’s borders to create more resilient networks of democracy defenders. This can be achieved by dedicating resources and time to building stronger networks aimed at collaboration rather than competition and (in)formal channels of exchange. Furthermore, CSOs and the EU need to commit to advocate for public policy that protects the most marginalised communities, such as LGBTQI+, economically underprivileged and racialised groups, given that they will suffer the consequences of rising illiberalism first and hardest.
The determination of European institutions to protect and enhance our democratic foundations should be as real and concrete as the determination of those seeking to undermine the rule of law and liberal democratic values. Only by working together with strategic clarity and unwavering commitment can our democracy be effectively safeguarded and strengthened for generations to come.
The recommendations in this document are inspired by the conversations held during the event organised by the European Policy Centre, together with Democracy Reporting International and Stiftung Mercator. They hosted the second Rule of Law Community meeting in Brussels. This productive gathering brought together more than 40 civil society organisations (CSOs) from across Europe dedicated to guarding the rule of law.
Liza Saris is Project Manager Connecting Europe at the Transnationalisation programme at the European Policy Centre.