The overt attempts of Elon Musk to influence politics, first in the US and now in Europe, suggest an emboldened Big Tech elite will increasingly seek to mould politics in line with its own interests. To counter this and protect democratic process and public debate, the EU must act decisively to regulate the current digital model while fostering efforts to build an alternative.
Elon Musk is now kingmaker in the United States, and Europe could be next. And if Musk’s brazen intervention in American politics pays off, then Brussels should be prepared for Silicon Valley’s influence to grow more partisan and aggressively political.
Clearly, not all tech billionaires hold the same political opinions or attitudes, yet we’re currently witnessing the wealthiest tech elite publicly falling in line behind the incoming Trump administration.
Furthermore, something all US tech companies have in common is their growing frustration with Brussels and the EU’s leading role as a global tech regulator. EU policymakers should be aware that a more politically partisan breed of Silicon Valley magnate is emerging, and that supporting populist, Eurosceptic, or even far-right political forces may be a tempting way for tech barons to try and bring Brussels to heel.
Europe’s democracy at stake
Brussels has been awash with big tech lobbying money for years. In 2022, Georg Riekeles, Associate Director at the European Policy Centre, warned that the Brussels policy community was already “insidiously” in the grip of the big tech lobbying class. However, tech corporations have, until Musk, tried to remain largely above the political fray. In the future, we should expect transatlantic lobbying to be accompanied by more aggressively partisan interventions, including reaching out to European voters directly through global communications platforms, but also potentially donating to techno-populist political parties, think tanks and groups.
In 2024, donors from the US tech sector contributed a significant chunk (over 10% if non-profit donations are included) of the eye-watering $4.7 billion raised by both parties during the US presidential election. Elon Musk, the world’s richest person, is now also America’s largest political donor, giving $277 million to the Trump campaign this election cycle. Musk is preparing for his new role as an “efficiency tsar” advising the Trump administration on ways to slash spending and cut “red tape” (potentially including in industries Musk has a financial stake in).
In late December, Musk nearly scuppered a bipartisan agreement on a short-term funding law to keep the US government running. Since the election, Bloomberg reports that Musk’s net worth has jumped by 77% to over $400 billion.
A clear flexing of Musk’s newfound political muscles is the recent H-1B visa debate, pitting big tech (led by Musk) against the ethno-nationalist and nativist wing of MAGA. Trump has (so far) backed Musk. When forced to choose between Big Tech and his base, Trump chose Big Tech.
What should concern European policymakers is the possibility that the new donor class of tech billionaires may seek to deploy their US election playbook overseas, turning Silicon Valley into the political metropole of a global Empire of Technology. Even though Musk denies reports by the Sunday Times that he plans to give $100 million to the right-wing populist Reform party in the UK, he is giving “serious thought” to backing the party financially according to Reform leader Nigel Farage. Musk also regularly boosts European far-right figures and recently endorsed Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) on his social media platform and in an op-ed in a major German newspaper. He was also recently on the receiving end of a rare public admonishment from Italian President Sergio Mattarella not to intervene in Italian politics.
How the democratic promise of technology was broken
At the dawn of the digital age, the promise of social media was information democracy. Citizens would no longer be passive recipients of top-down messaging; instead, they would engage directly with one another in the online public sphere, bypassing traditional media gatekeepers. Authoritarian states, unable to maintain centralised control over these new peer-to-peer communication channels, would eventually fall in Arab Spring-style revolutions. In short, information and communication technologies would radically flatten hierarchies, bringing about an electronic agora for the digital age.
Yet the reality that has emerged is more complicated. The digital agora can be bought. Instead of a global village where all voices share the public square equally, we now have social media empires dominated by increasingly politically radical and partisan owners. Instead of civil debate, we have algorithms that prioritise rage-inducing “engagement” and polarisation. Instead of inclusive political dialogue, we have disinformation campaigns and the weaponisation of the digital public sphere by hostile state actors. The electronic agora has not materialised as a neutral forum for democratic deliberation. On the contrary, it has become a warzone where naked financial power is what matters, and where the wealthy – whether states or non-state actors – wield disproportionate influence by paying for our attention.
How the EU can fight back
The European Union, determined to position itself as a global tech regulator, exemplifies the kind of old-fashioned, hierarchical bureaucracy that Silicon Valley’s digital utopianism abhors. The EU will therefore likely face more and more challenges in preserving its sovereignty against the growing influence of the Empire of Technology. This is already happening, given the incoming US vice-president has threatened to retaliate against Europe if the EU penalises Musk’s social media platform for rule violations. To counterbalance this new dynamic, the EU will need to take urgent action.
Firstly, the EU must refuse to be bullied and continue to strengthen regulatory frameworks and expand its regulatory reach. The Union must update laws that cover emerging technologies like AI, satellite networks, autonomous technologies, and neural interfaces and ensure these regulations address the cross-border operations of Big Tech companies. It must also enforce strict antitrust measures and break up monopolistic behaviours within tech industries to prevent single entities from exerting an outsized influence.
The EU should also seek greater transparency by mandating clear reporting requirements on lobbying activities, election influence, political donations and data usage by Big Tech companies.
Secondly, the EU must redouble investment in its own technology base and grow a venture capital ecosystem on par with its ambitions. This will also involve stronger efforts to develop homegrown tech giants and provide incentives for European startups to create alternatives in space, energy and communications.
Thirdly, the EU should balance Washington’s influence in Brussels by seeking to influence Washington and work with American activists and pro-democracy tech companies to mitigate the worst impacts of partisan Big Tech while also coordinating with like-minded nations. It should strengthen alliances with countries prioritising sovereignty and regulation, such as Canada, the UK, Japan and nations in the Global South. These efforts should be focused on promoting the global governance of technology, advocating for international treaties that regulate tech monopolies and ensuring the ethical use of AI, neurotechnology, and satellite-based internet services.
Next, the EU should accelerate its efforts to protect digital sovereignty, starting with the requirement that critical EU data be stored and processed within its borders to prevent its misuse or surveillance. These efforts should also seek to protect critical infrastructure against manipulation by hyper-empowered non-state actors and to continue efforts to combat disinformation, starting with enforcing fines and even bans for social media platforms that consistently break the law.
Finally, the EU must strengthen and expand its efforts to engage citizens and educate them about the risks of persuasive technologies. These same programmes should seek to create avenues for meaningful public engagement in crafting technology policies, increasing trust and buy-in from EU citizens.
In the longer term, the EU should aim to lead the global conversation on ethical technology governance. By framing itself as a bastion of digital rights, transparency and fair competition, it can counterbalance the power of the Empire of Technology and mitigate its ability to weaken democracy.
Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the EPC.
Joe Litobarski is a PhD Candidate at Maastricht University.
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