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COMMENTARY

Coalitions of the willing must be deployed to Ukraine before the summer






Ukraine / COMMENTARY
Amanda Paul , Lev Zinchenko

Date: 16/04/2025

The deployment of different coalitions of the willing (CoWs) to Ukraine ahead of a future ceasefire is not just necessary – it is the only viable path forward to shore up Ukraine’s security and allow the country to start future talks from a position of strength. If left without sufficient support, Ukraine’s ability to resist may collapse, triggering a domino effect of insecurity across Europe. Strategic inaction is no longer an option – it is a direct path to greater instability, not only for Ukraine but for the entire Euro-Atlantic community.

Recent high-level discussions in Paris and London confirm that a CoW is no longer just a theoretical concept but that it is evolving into a structured reassurance force, or forces, which would address critical shortfalls in Ukraine’s defence capabilities. With Russia stepping up its attacks on Ukraine, the establishment of such a force must rapidly accelerate. Potential CoWs should be agile and go beyond the original four-step approach laid out by the British and French leaders. This would allow for the deployment of different CoWs based on Ukraine’s most urgent, medium- and long-term needs. Persistent fears over how the Kremlin may respond and excessive risk aversion are signs of weakness that only embolden Russia. They must not become an obstacle to quick and effective implementation.

CoWs should not only accelerate the conditions necessary for a ceasefire but also impose credible constraints on Russia’s capacity to escalate. Over the last few weeks, Russia has demonstrated blatant disregard for the proposed 30-day unconditional ceasefire - an initiative put forward by Washington in Riyadh and accepted by Ukraine. Instead of de-escalating, Russian forces have intensified strikes on civilian and energy infrastructure, resulting in mounting civilian casualties. This has included the death of nine children after Russia attacked a densely populated area in President Zelenskyy’s home town of Kryvyi Rih and a ballistic attack on the city of Sumy on Palm Sunday leaving more than 30 civilians dead, including two children.

While meaningful peace negotiations remain distant, the likelihood of compelling Russia to come to the negotiating table increases significantly with the presence of a robust deterrent – something combinations of CoWs can deliver. Only through the projection of coordinated and resolute military support can the West counteract Moscow’s strategy of attrition and bring diplomatic solutions within reach.

Objectively, CoWs composed of several European states, plus the likes of Canada, Australia and Türkiye, have the means to deter Russia, which is neither a military nor an economic superpower. This is all the more urgent given that Ukraines intelligence assessments indicate that Russia is preparing for a major escalation across the entire “hot” frontline, which exceeds more than 1,200 kilometres, by the summer, primarily by amassing reserves.

 

Ukrainian security is key to European security

On 31 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree ordering the conscription of 160,000 Russians aged from 18 to 30. It is the largest draft in nearly 15 years and will be implemented between 1 April and 15 July 2025. While Moscow clearly wants to compensate for its heavy military losses on the battlefield, given the huge scale of the numbers, it also indicates not only an immediate military offensive campaign is afoot in Ukraine but potentially a wider confrontation with the EU and NATO member states too.  

Given Ukraines operational constraints – including manpower shortages, dwindling ammunition supplies and logistical challenges – a rapid and substantial military reinforcement is not just critical but existential. Thus, the implementation of CoWs before the summer is not merely desirable – it is imperative to Ukraines survival and European security more broadly. The initiative must prioritise three key objectives: immediate force augmentation, the protection of critical infrastructure, and enhanced training and tactical assistance.

 

Boosting Ukrainian forces

Ukraines defensive capabilities remain hampered by delays in weapons deliveries and inefficiencies in international support mechanisms, along with Washington’s change of policy. While NATO as an organisation is reluctant to deploy forces directly, coalitions of committed states can provide targeted assistance to Ukraine in key areas such as intelligence sharing, air defence and logistical support. Indeed, coalitions are not a new concept. A Czech-led initiative has played an important role in supplying Ukraine with ammunition. This would also complement recent proposals put forward by the European Commission to turn Ukraine into a ‘steel porcupine.

One potential CoW could number a few thousand troops and be deployed in clusters in different locations across Ukraine, although far from the front and focused on advisory and operational planning roles, and not as a military force. It could significantly enhance Ukraines capacity to resist Russian advances and execute counteroffensive operations. Vitally for European defence, CoW must establish training and equipment hubs to ensure rapid and seamless integration of newly supplied systems into Ukraine’s military structure to accelerate battlefield readiness.

The deployment of a CoW in non-combat capacities would also introduce strategic ambiguity into Russian planning, decreasing the risks associated with further escalation. Furthermore, the presence of Western military advisors should improve battlefield coordination, optimise the deployment of Western-supplied weapons systems, and enable a more agile response to evolving threats. These measures would not only fortify Ukraines defences but also send an unequivocal message: sustained Western support is non-negotiable, and any Russian attempts to test Western resolve will be met with decisive action.

 

Protection of critical infrastructure

Russias relentless attacks on Ukraines critical infrastructure – energy grids, transport networks, port infrastructure, including the strategic Black Sea port of Odesa and industrial hubs – aim to cripple economic resilience and break civilian morale. A recent attack on a power plant in Kherson left some 45,000 residents without electricity. Ensuring the functionality of these systems is fundamental to sustaining Ukraines war effort and preventing large-scale humanitarian catastrophes. A CoW can play a decisive role in neutralising these threats by reinforcing air defence coverage over strategic locations, and supporting rapid repair and reconstruction efforts. While sourcing more air defence systems is crucial, developing a CoW air protection zone around Kyiv and other non-frontline cities to stop the targeting of civilian infrastructure by Russia, as outlined in the recent Sky Shield plan, is also crucial. A deployment of a marine battalion in Odesa would be a strategic addition to Ukraine’s maritime posture, offering enhanced amphibious and coastal defence capabilities to ensure security in the Black Sea.

Furthermore, given the increasing integration of cyber and kinetic warfare, nations with expertise in countering hybrid threats – such as Poland, Estonia, and the United Kingdom – must take the lead in safeguarding Ukraines digital and physical infrastructure. A robust infrastructure defence strategy will deny Russia the ability to weaponise economic and energy disruption as instruments of coercion.

 

Training and tactical assistance

To accelerate Ukraines adaptation to Western military doctrines and technologies, CoWs must intensify training efforts on the ground in Ukraine. Current training programmes – largely conducted in European NATO member states – are effective but constrained by logistical limitations and delays. Establishing training hubs inside Ukraine would allow for real-time instruction on newly delivered weapons systems, enhance unit cohesion and facilitate seamless interoperability between Ukrainian forces and Western military structures.

Military advisors embedded within Ukraines operational command structures would provide strategic guidance, assist in refining combined-arms tactics, and support the integration of advanced surveillance and reconnaissance technologies. Additionally, battlefield medical training programmes would improve casualty evacuation and treatment protocols, reducing attrition rates among Ukrainian personnel. Alleviating pressure on Ukraine’s overstretched healthcare system is crucial and possible through the tactical deployment of at least two military field hospitals to treat wounded soldiers and civilians.

The deployment of training contingents would not constitute direct combat involvement but would serve as a force multiplier, significantly strengthening Ukraines ability to sustain prolonged defensive and counteroffensive operations.

 

The time to act is now

With a large-scale Russian offensive expected, the urgency for enhanced military assistance cannot be overstated. The deployment of CoWs before the summer would provide Ukraine with the necessary resources to sustain its defence, deter further Russian aggression, and uphold the stability of the broader European security landscape.

Russia’s clear refusal to engage in ceasefire discussions should dispel any illusions that peace is imminent. For over a decade, Europe has failed to take decisive action, missing crucial opportunities for proactive deterrence that could have altered the trajectory of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The belated realisation that European security is inextricably linked to Ukraine’s resilience must now translate into immediate action. Failure to provide sufficient military and strategic support at this critical juncture in the war will embolden Moscow – especially amid the major shift in US policy and what is widely perceived as President Trump’s recalibrated approach to Russia in the context of ongoing bilateral negotiations between the US, Russia, and Ukraine for a sustainable ceasefire.

Russia is already exploiting the West’s hesitation, violating ceasefires with impunity and intensifying its assaults on Ukrainian infrastructure. This perceived lack of consequences not only rewards Russian aggression but also shifts the global balance of power in favour of authoritarian revisionism.

The implementation of CoWs would be a demonstration of unwavering political resolve, proving that European security actors and other partners can take decisive action even without a full consensus. A well-calibrated coalition presence – focused on defensive and support roles – can mitigate risks while reinforcing Ukraine’s strategic depth. The deployment of CoW also will provide first-hand in-the-field insight into modern warfare by learning directly from Ukraine’s frontline experience: essential experience in light of escalating Russian aggression across the European continent. Timely intervention could introduce new vulnerabilities for Russia, potentially accelerating the conditions necessary for a just and lasting peace on the European continent and ensure that Ukraine remains a viable, sovereign state capable of defending itself. 




Amanda Paul is Deputy Head of the Europe in the World Programme and a Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre.

Lev Zinchenko is a former Programme Assistant in the Europe in the World Programme at the EPC and Advocacy Programme Coordinator at Razom for Ukraine.


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Photo credits:
Francois Nascimbeni / AFP

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