Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Mongolia has called into question the International Criminal Court’s enforcement mechanisms and exposed Mongolia’s delicate geopolitical situation. The EU and its partners should avoid knee-jerk reactions and build Mongolia’s capacity to deflect the Kremlin’s blackmail diplomacy.
On September 3, 2024, Putin paid an official visit to Mongolia at the invitation of President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh – his first trip to a signatory of the Rome Statute since the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant against him in March 2023. In advance of Putin’s visit, ICC State Parties – and candidate Ukraine – emphasised that the Rome Statute required his arrest and surrender to the ICC, where he faces charges for the extradition and abduction of Ukrainian children – as documented by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and Ukraine’s General Prosecutor’s Office.
However, rather than cancel the visit or enforce the warrant, the Mongolian government extended a welcome marked by an eclectic array of bilateral anniversaries. These included the Soviet-Mongolian victory at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in 1939, the joint founding of Mongolia’s national railway operator at the end of World War II, and the fifth anniversary of a comprehensive strategic partnership.
The visit further weakened the international consensus that ought to uphold the ICC, which lacks the support of the two global superpowers – the US and China – and had already seen some of its State Parties declare they would ignore the warrant. It also compromised Mongolia’s hitherto ambiguous stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Mongolia abstained from condemning Russia at the UN General Assembly and did not attend the recent Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland. However, it has subtly expressed disagreement over Russia’s actions in its bilateral engagements with the EU. Notable political figures outside the ruling Mongolian People’s Party, such as former President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, have voiced strong opposition, reflecting the sentiment of a segment of the Mongolian population. Additionally, the country recently secured the appointment of its first judge to the ICC and co-signed a joint statement with 94 other State Parties expressing “unwavering support” for ICC officials in the face of growing threats and pressure against the Court’s Ukraine and Gaza investigations.
Proceeding with Putin’s visit may have also harmed Mongolia’s domestic institutions. In 2021, the State Great Khural – the country's legislature – passed laws to protect human rights advocates and reform the judiciary, paving the way for a more independent legal system. Earlier this summer, parliamentary elections saw the Great Khural jump from 76 to 126 seats, broadening representation beyond Ulaanbaatar and into the provinces. Failure to uphold its commitments to international humanitarian law may overshadow these positive steps and tarnish Mongolia’s reputation as a neutral, democratic actor in the eyes of its ‘third neighbours’ – a loosely defined group of distant powers (mainly the US, Japan, India, and the EU27) capable of balancing the outsized influence of Mongolia's only two neighbours (Russia and China) through alternative trade, investment, energy, and connectivity initiatives.
The Kremlin’s blackmail diplomacy
Rather than gross misjudgement, Mongolia’s readiness to host Putin reflects a narrow margin of manoeuvre. Despite growing investment and trade with the EU, the landlocked country remains heavily dependent on Chinese export markets and Russian energy imports. Russian operators like Inter RAO supply electricity meeting 20% of Mongolia’s domestic demand, which spikes during the winter months as temperatures in the capital plummet to −40 °C lows. Similarly, despite its vast crude oil reserves, the country imports circa 90% of its processed hydrocarbon stocks, with Russian giants like Rosneft controlling the supply of refined oil on which the mining and industrial sectors – and thereby the bulk of the national economy – depend.
Aware of the extent of these dependencies, the Mongolian government has laid down plans to diversify its economy and trade partners, intending to scale down the extractivist model that binds the country to the will of foreign suppliers and the volatility of commodity markets. It has also identified the development of domestic energy sources capable of phasing out its current coal-heavy energy mix as a double imperative: crucial to preserving the country’s frail ecosystems and its national sovereignty.
But the looming threat of electricity shortages and supply disruptions, and the preeminent position of the mining sector makes it challenging to prioritise long-term diversification over expedient, quick solutions – a dilemma which the Kremlin knows how to exploit. Indeed, neither the substantial oil agreements signed ahead of Putin’s visit nor the flurry of commitments made during it – including guarantees for Ulaanbaatar’s oil supply and the modernisation of its coal-fired thermal plants – were accidental. Reinforcing the status quo of Mongolia’s dependencies, these deals were also skilfully aimed at stoking enthusiasm (previously lacking) for the construction of gas pipelines to China across Mongolian territory – a priority for Russia as it seeks to make up for lost European markets and dump more of its gas into China, which has proved more cautious around the dependency trap than its European predecessors.
Beyond discussing energy deals, Putin’s visit was likely designed to draw a red line between his ‘bargain’ and further engagement with ‘third neighbours,’ while simultaneously inducing Mongolia to treat its international aspirations and material constraints as mutually exclusive. With a shared border spanning more than 8,000 km and a same-gauge railway line connecting the Mongolian heartland with Russia, deflecting the Kremlin’s ploy would have required more than diplomatic ingenuity alone from Ulaanbaatar.
Ignoring the bait and doubling down
At the regional and global level, Putin’s visit has also sought to portray a Russia undeterred by multilateral norms, capable of maintaining its grip on the post-Soviet space despite China’s rising influence and the more assertive foreign policies of Mongolia and Central Asian countries (which were all absent from the Peace Summit in Switzerland). Tajikistan, the region’s poorest and its single ICC State Party, could become Putin’s next tour stop, as the country hosts a significant contingency of Russian troops and its economy is heavily reliant on the remittances of its sizable diaspora in Russia.
The EU faces a delicate task in responding to this blackmail diplomacy. While condemnation of the Rome Statute’s violation should be unequivocal, downgrading ties with Mongolia – or with countries facing a similar predicament – would only hand a strategic victory to Putin. Instead, EU policymakers need to understand Mongolia’s actions in their regional context, where complete disengagement from either of its neighbours could result in the total dominance of the other, hence in the dismantling of the ‘multi-pillar’ foreign policy that has seen the country grow closer to the EU. Sustained engagement, trade, investment, and development of alternative energy sources – through Global Gateway and EIB funds or bilateral partnerships with member states such as Germany and France – will thus be more crucial than ever if Mongolia is to heed the dictates of international law over those of realpolitik. In concrete terms, the EU can respond to Putin’s visit by doubling down on its commitments to:
- The development of alternative energy sources – particularly solar and wind – capable of reducing Mongolia’s dependency on imported electricity to a minimum. The energy-hungry mining sector will continue to demand Russian refined oil until a refinery becomes fully operational within Mongolian territory – perhaps in the latter half of the decade. Until then, Mongolians should at least be able to independently meet their domestic electricity demands – particularly during winter.
- The diversification and connectivity of the Mongolian economy, as outlined in the Commission’s Multi-annual Indicative Programme. Mongolia’s reserves of critical raw materials are attractive for an EU in dire need of diversified supply chains, but investment on this front should be offset by the development of alternative exports and the services sector. Improved digital infrastructure and connectivity would enable Mongolia to increase its participation in global value chains, reducing dependency on the buyers and sellers who dominate its mining sector.
- The integration of Mongolia in the multilateral system. Marginalising Mongolia in international fora due to its failure to arrest Putin would be misguided and might only push the country into Russia’s orbit. With President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh formally invited to the upcoming 16th BRICS Summit, the EU should convey that its doors remain open.
Raul Villegas is a Junior Policy Analyst in the Europe in the World Programme.
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