I. Summary of findings: the varieties of illiberalism in Europe

The research across seven focus countries—Austria, Czechia, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, and Poland—demonstrates that liberal democracy is under a multi-faceted threat from diverse illiberal forces. These challengers are not a monolithic group; they include traditionalist-religious, xenophobic-populist, and non-populist right-wing parties, each mobilising different social constituencies.

Key findings by country:

• Hungary: represents the most consolidated case of democratic backsliding, having transitioned into an electoral autocracy under Fidesz. The regime maintains power through a combination of constitutional engineering, the capture of media and cultural institutions, and a “work-based” social policy that rewards “deserving” native citizens while excluding minorities.

• Poland: previously a major case of backsliding under the Law and Justice (PiS) party, it is currently in a state of contested democratic recovery. PiS successfully utilised paternalist populism—large social transfers like the “500+” child benefit—to build voter loyalty before losing power in 2023.

• France: the Rassemblement National (RN) has successfully employed a strategy of “de-demonisation,” reframing exclusionary nativism into “republican” language. This has led to “position contagion,” where mainstream parties adopt far-right rhetoric on Islam and multiculturalism, particularly after terror attacks.

• Italy: serves as a transnational hub for the far-right. The governing Brothers of Italy (FdI) party emphasises a “Europe of sovereign nations” and has deep ties to religious intermediary organisations, a phenomenon termed “confessional illiberalism”.

• Czechia: while institutions remain resilient, the return to power of Andrej Babiš’s ANO party in 2025, supported by the radical right, signals a growing shift toward technocratic populism and Euroscepticism.

• Great Britain: faces potential backsliding as the Reform UK party moves from the fringes to the mainstream, capitalising on post-Brexit grievances and utilising social media to normalise authoritarian “will of the majority” narratives.

• Austria: the FPÖ remains a stable illiberal force, distinguished by its ties to nationalist fraternities and its focus on “welfare chauvinism,” seeking to restrict social benefits based on language proficiency.

II. Key trends in the development of radical right movements

1. Mainstreaming and the erosion of the cordon sanitaire. Illiberal actors are no longer confined to the political fringes; they are now well-established players who influence policy even when out of office. A critical trend is the rightward drift of the political centre, where mainstream conservative parties adapt to illiberal frames to compete for voters, effectively normalising radical right agendas.

2. Transnationalisation and the “illiberal international”. Radical right movements are increasingly internationalised, forming networks that exchange strategies and legitimacy. This involves:

   • Think Tank networks: organisations like the Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC) and Ordo Iuris act as “intellectual clearing houses,” translating American culture war tactics into European legal and political language.

   • The Role of intellectuals: illiberal think tanks connect national elites with American and European intellectuals (e.g., Patrick Deneen, Tucker Carlson) to disseminate critiques of liberal democracy.

   • Thin diffusion via social media: movements use platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram to spread “master frames” and coordinate protests across borders without highly structured organisations.

3. Weaponisation of policy and culture. Illiberalism advances through gradual, cumulative processes rather than abrupt ruptures.

   • Cultural policy: governments use “hidden agendas” to achieve elite replacement in museums, theatres, and universities, promoting nationalist and traditionalist “re-canonisation” of culture.

   • Educational control: by eliminating school autonomy and introducing single-textbook systems, illiberal actors ensure their narratives are reproduced among younger generations.

   • Social policy as vote-buying: illiberal parties often implement “paradigmatic” welfare reforms, such as lowering the pension age or providing generous family subsidies, but target them exclusively at “deserving” insiders to build long-term electoral loyalty.

4. Synthesis of the “illiberal ecosystem” functions. To understand how these organisations function as a cohesive system, the literature suggests three primary “pillars”:

   • The endowment model (financial): unlike liberal NGOs that rely on annual grants, the “new wave” (like MCC) uses asset transfers. By holding large blocks of state-owned shares (energy, pharma), they achieve permanent financial independence from future government changes. A sophisticated new trend is the creation of parallel information ecosystems and institutions. The MCC endowment model uses massive state asset transfers to ensure permanent financial independence, allowing these organisations to bypass democratic oversight and create a self-contained world of “illiberal academic capital”.

   • The “re-civilisation” strategy (structural): they do not merely compete with liberal NGOs; they replace them. By creating “parallel” universities, bar associations, and media regulators, they build a self-contained world where illiberal actors can gain credentials and “academic capital.”

   • The “intellectual clearing house” (transnational): these think tanks act as translators. They take specific American “Culture War” tactics (anti-woke, anti-ESG) and translate them into European legal language (Sovereignty, National Identity, Subsidiarity) to influence EU law.

III. Recommendations: countering illiberal trends

To counter illiberal cultural narratives effectively, democratic movements must move beyond a defensive posture and adopt a multi-level strategy that combines safeguarding and reforming institutions, narrative reclamation, socio-economic intervention, enhanced civic literacy, and transnational coordination and transparency. Research suggests that because illiberalism advances through gradual, cumulative processes that reshape public discourse, the response must be equally sustained and strategic.

1. Safeguarding and reforming institutions

   • Reinforce horizontal accountability: protecting judicial independence and constitutional oversight bodies is essential, as they serve as primary buffers against backsliding.

   • Depoliticise public media: take measures to ensure media pluralism and prevent governing parties from nationalising public broadcasters.

   • Enforce conflict-of-interest rules: uphold legal standards for transparency in governance to prevent the unfair competition often used by populist leaders.

2. Reclaiming and redefining democratic narratives

Democratic actors must move beyond defending institutions and actively articulate why pluralism and institutional checks are essential preconditions for democracy, not obstacles.

• Articulating preconditions: pro-democracy actors should reframe institutional constraints and minority rights as the very elements that protect popular sovereignty, not as limitations on it.

• Combating “position contagion”: mainstream parties must avoid mimicking illiberal rhetoric, as this validates far-right frames and fails to moderate their influence. Instead, they must offer credible, democratic alternatives rooted in national histories of freedom and cooperation.

• Constructing “counter-publics”: scholars and social movements should invest in “frame resonance” tactics, constructing counter-narratives that can convince broad transnational audiences and challenge hegemonic illiberal discourse in the public sphere.

3. Addressing the “demand side” of illiberalism

Countering illiberal narratives requires addressing the deep-seated grievances and anxieties that make these messages resonant in the first place.

• Reducing socio-economic insecurity: democratic actors should prioritise policies that tackle regional disparities and economic insecurity, which frequently fuel resentment towards perceived “out-of-touch” elites. Particular attention should be paid to poverty alleviation, as illiberal parties tend to reward “deserving” middle-class insiders while neglecting the most marginalised constituencies, leaving significant room for democratic alternatives.

• Fostering Unity and Hope: effective democratic campaigns, such as Petr Pavel’s 2023 presidential campaign in Czechia, have shown that emphasising shared values, civility, and a positive vision can work better than responding to fear-based, divisive tactics on their own terms.

4. Enhancing civic and media literacy

Because illiberal actors utilise parallel information ecosystems and “trolling” tactics in cultural fiction to spread ideology, democratic resilience requires a more informed citizenry.

• Critical digital literacy: strengthening citizens’ ability to navigate fragmented public spheres and identify disinformation is vital for countering illiberal narratives.

• Civic education: efforts to develop critical thinking and social cohesion through education can foster long-term societal resilience against “us-versus-them” dichotomies.

• Democratic innovations: utilising deliberative processes can help mitigate societal polarisation and encourage constructive engagement between different segments of the electorate.

5. Transnational coordination and transparency

Given the increasingly transnational character of illiberal networks, democratic responses must equally be coordinated across borders.

• Reinforcing cross-border standards: democratic actors need coordinated European responses that reinforce democratic norms and standards across borders, counter the transnational diffusion of illiberal strategies, and prevent the erosion of the cordon sanitaire through normalisation via coalition-building. Mainstream parties should remain wary of including far-right actors in government, as this rarely leads to lasting moderation and often pulls the entire party system further to the right.

• Supporting “counter-publics”: progressive social movements and scholars should invest in “frame resonance” tactics, constructing counter-narratives capable of convincing broad transnational audiences and challenging hegemonic illiberal discourse.

• Investigating influence networks: greater transparency is needed on the financial ties and funding streams of illiberal think tanks, including potential links to the fossil fuel industry or foreign state actors, to expose their mechanisms of influence and hold these networks to account.

Conclusion

Illiberalism in Europe is gradual, adaptive, and increasingly networked. While societal support for the ideal of democracy remains high, the actual attachment to liberal principles is often conditional. To build resilience, democratic actors must move beyond institutional defence to address the demand-side drivers of illiberalism and reclaim the narrative that only a pluralistic, checked-and-balanced state can truly protect popular sovereignty.

Appendix: three analytical focus areas

Part 1. Illiberalism and economic inequality

The link between illiberalism and economic inequality is characterised by a vicious feedback loop in which inequality both drives support for illiberal leaders and results from their governance.

Economic inequality as a driver (the demand side)

Societal demand for illiberal, “strongman” leadership often intensifies during periods of high economic inequality and crisis. Citizens experiencing economic hardship, regional disparities, or subjective insecurity often lose faith in democratic institutions’ ability to deliver fair outcomes. This disillusionment makes them more receptive to leaders who promise to bypass institutional gridlock and horizontal checks to fight on behalf of the “ordinary people” against perceived “out-of-touch elites”.

The impact of illiberal leaders (the supply side)

While illiberal leaders often campaign on economic grievances and redistribution, research across 120 countries indicates they do not follow through on these promises in ways that benefit most citizens.

• Worsening inequality: illiberal leaders on the economic right systematically exacerbate income inequality. Their tenure is a significant predictor of future increases in inequality, whereas liberal leaders or illiberal leftists have no discernible effect on reducing it.

• Effectiveness in the wrong direction: illiberal “strongmen” are more effective than their liberal counterparts at translating their economic preferences into material changes, but only in the direction of greater inequality.

• Asymmetric success: this effectiveness is asymmetric; while democratic institutions may constrain both left and right policy agendas, illiberal leaders can more easily pursue right-wing policies (like privatisation and anti-union measures) because they align with existing economic power structures and elite interests.

Mechanisms linking illiberalism and inequality

Illiberal regimes utilise several strategies that reinforce economic disparities:

• Selective redistribution: illiberal parties often implement “paradigmatic” welfare reforms that replace universal systems with a “work-based” society. These programs reward “deserving” insiders, typically native-born, traditional families, while excluding “undeserving” outsiders like immigrants or the “willingly jobless”.

• Dismantling accountability: right-wing illiberals are particularly successful at undermining judicial constraints. The erosion of an independent judiciary is highly consequential, as these institutions often help maintain economic fairness and horizontal accountability.

• Cultural masking: illiberal leaders frequently use “culture war” issues, such as immigration or national identity, to mask an economic agenda that increases inequality. This strategy allows them to implement policies that reward wealthy supporters while maintaining popular support through cultural appeals.

The vicious feedback loop

Ultimately, the economic policies of right-wing illiberals create a self-reinforcing cycle. By passing policies that increase inequality, they generate more economic grievances and uncertainty among the electorate, which in turn fuels further popular demand for “strong” leadership. Meanwhile, the resulting concentration of wealth strengthens the political power of economic elites, who have financial incentives to support the leader’s continued rule.

Part 2. Use of cultural fiction

Far-right movements use cultural fiction as a powerful tool to spread ideology by embedding illiberal narratives in non-political domains, such as literature, where they can bypass traditional gatekeepers and reach a wider, mainstream audience. This process is largely driven by a combination of intra-textual rhetorical strategies and extra-textual social capital management.

1. Intra-textual strategies: rhetoric and framing

Far-right fiction often incorporates extremist theories, such as the “great replacement,” by using sophisticated linguistic tactics to make them more palatable:

• Use of far-right “interdiscourse”: authors replicate the cognitive structures and arguments of the far-right while avoiding politically charged or legally liable terms like “invasion” or “replacement”. This allows the ideas to resonate with readers already in right-wing echo chambers without immediately triggering institutional censorship.

• Depoliticising racism: fiction can reframe systemic racism or Islamophobia as an individual, psychological, or emotional reaction such as “irrational hostility” or a desire for revenge following a fictional tragedy. This “psychologisation” tends to obscure the systemic nature of discrimination and normalise it as an inevitable human behaviour.

• Rhetorical ambiguity and “trolling”: some authors maintain a “double-coded” stance, using provocation and irony to stay ambiguous about whether they are endorsing or critiquing their characters’ views. This strategy, similar to online trolling, allows for plausible deniability, shielding the author from criticism by claiming the work is merely “speculative fiction” or satire.

2. Extra-textual strategies: social and discursive capital

The successful diffusion of far-right fiction depends heavily on the author’s “posture” and their ability to manipulate social and discursive capital:

• Political gaslighting: authors may actively deny having a political agenda in media appearances, claiming to be mere observers of the “human condition”. This destabilises critical interpretations of the work and encourages readers to view ideological messages as “timeless truths” rather than political commentary.

• Bypassing gatekeepers via networks: high-profile authors leverage their extensive connections in media, academic, and literary circles to secure favourable reception. By engaging with mainstream or even left-wing media, they gain a “stamp of approval” that helps mainstream their worldview.

• Mainstreaming through celebrity: the commercial success and media visibility of a “celebrity author” can create a protective barrier, where academic defenders frame the work as “metaphysical questioning” beyond ideological scrutiny.

3. The role of cultural ecosystems in normalisation

Ultimately, fiction blurs the boundaries between imagination and ideological commentary. When far-right narratives are successfully embedded in popular novels, they contribute to the “position contagion” seen in mainstream politics, where centrist actors eventually adopt similar exclusionary rhetoric under the guise of defending national identity or civic values. The cultural ecosystem thus acts as a powerbroker, letting illiberal values circulate and become normalised in “infra-political” spaces before they appear in formal policy.

Part 3. Targeting rural populations

Targeted rural spending is not merely a social policy but a strategic tool of statecraft that allows illiberal actors to manufacture popular legitimacy and institutionalise their power at the local level, making democratic recovery increasingly difficult. The role of targeted rural spending manifests through the following mechanisms:

1. Rewarding core support and cultivating loyalty

Illiberal governments strategically allocate resources to settlements where they already have strong electoral performance. In Hungary, the Hungarian Village Program (HVP)—a discretionary fund for infrastructure—was significantly more likely to be directed toward “core settlements” where the ruling Fidesz party had previously outperformed expectations. By rewarding these areas, the regime reinforces existing partisan networks and demonstrates the tangible benefits of political loyalty.

2. Mobilisation and demobilisation

Targeted spending acts as a lever for manipulating electoral turnout. Research indicates that both eligibility for subsidies and the actual disbursement of funds have distinct effects:

• Mobilising supporters: these programs successfully bring core supporters and previously inactive or disengaged voters to the polls.

• Demobilising the opposition: crucially, targeted spending has been found to discourage opposition participation, effectively shrinking the opponent’s voter base without necessarily needing to “convert” them to the ruling party.

3. Credit-claiming and signalling competence

To ensure that spending translates into political support, illiberal regimes employ aggressive credit-claiming strategies. Funded settlements are often required to display “support signs” featuring the government’s logo and the prime minister’s photograph. This serves two informational functions:

• Signalling competence: it demonstrates the government’s ability to implement large-scale initiatives independently of external actors like the EU.

• Signalling policy priority: it sends a clear message that rural populations “matter” and are a prioritised group, fostering a sense of ontological security and collective identity aligned with the regime.

4. Portfolio diversification of policies

Backsliding regimes often use a mix of spending types to appeal to different voter needs:

• Programmatic policies: such as the Rural Family Housing Allowance Program (Rural CSOK), which uses objective criteria (like population size) to provide housing subsidies. These establish a broad sense of “deservingness” among the native population.

• Non-programmatic/discretionary policies: Such as the HVP, which lets the government maintain total control over which settlements receive funding and when, facilitating clientelistic exchanges.

5. Establishing parallel influence and dependency

Targeted spending often relies on local political brokers, such as mayors, to manage applications and distribution. This empowers local officials who are politically aligned with the centre, creating a durable clientelist infrastructure that bypasses standard institutional checks and balances. Over time, this creates a vicious feedback loop: increased inequality and economic uncertainty drive popular demand for “strong” leadership, while the government uses its control over resources to suppress dissent and reward conformity.

This document was produced with the help of NOTEBOOK LLM, summarising all the papers published by the Authlib project by the Central European University – CEU.

Goran Buldioski is a Senior Adviser at the On Think Tanks.

This article is part of Democracy under Pressure, a collaborative initiative by the European Policy Centre and On Think Tanks (OTT), supported by the Network of European Foundations. The initiative brings together think tank leaders across Europe to strengthen collaboration and develop practical responses to the challenges facing democratic, liberal and plural institutions. Explore the project page for more insights, meeting summaries and publications.

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