Serbia’s Mrdić law reversal: The EU should not mistake tactical compliance for reform
Some voices in the EU argue that Serbia should now be allowed to advance in its accession process by opening Cluster 3 despite ongoing repression and rule of law erosion. Belgrade’s June reversal of the so-called Mrdić laws has become a convenient justification. The European Commission is currently pushing member states to authorize the opening of the cluster on competitiveness and inclusive growth, arguing that Serbia made “efforts on key matters and that the overall balance necessary for this step is currently ensured”.
But the EU is mistaking tactical compliance for genuine reform, exposing once again the structural weakness in managing conditionality in the Western Balkans.
In January, the Serbian National Assembly passed a controversial package of judicial legislation, informally named after Uglješa Mrdić, the SNS member of parliament who proposed them. The Venice Commission concluded in April that the laws weakened judicial independence. In response, the European Commission froze Growth Plan funds for Serbia in May.
Belgrade’s subsequent backtracking in June has now given some EU stakeholders an argument for allowing the country to open Cluster 3, a decision that has since 2021 been held back due to rule of law shortcomings. But this sequence should not be mistaken for genuine reform. Rewarding this behaviour would entrench SNS's old pattern: create a crisis, then extract concessions for de-escalating it. If EU member states decide to open Cluster 3 for geopolitical reasons or to signal support for Serbian citizens, they should say so openly. What the EU cannot afford is to present such a decision as proof of genuine reform by the Serbian government
Over the past year, estrangement between Brussels and Belgrade has grown. In December, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić refused to attend the EU-Western Balkans summit in Brussels in protest of Serbia’s lack of progress on the EU path. A month earlier, the Commission had reported serious shortcomings and backsliding on rule of law, preventing Serbia from opening Cluster 3.
Cluster 3 on competitiveness and inclusive growth has been assessed as technically ready since 2021. However, under the 2020 revised enlargement methodology, its opening is linked to performance on the fundamentals and requires unanimity among all 27 member states. Given the government’s continued erosion of the rule of law, insufficient progress in the dialogue with Kosovo and increasingly repressive domestic environment since the start of student protests in November 2024, the country has made no meaningful progress towards the EU since opening Cluster 4 on the green agenda in December 2021. Meanwhile, Montenegro and Albania have advanced significantly, with the Commission endorsing their ambitions to close negotiations by 2026 and 2027 respectively.
The Commission argues that Serbia should be allowed to move forward in the EU path in order to incentivise democratic reforms and keep the country strategically anchored to Europe. The Franco-German proposal, put forward by Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz ahead of the latest EU-Western Balkans summit in Montenegro in June 2026, was also going in that direction.
The proposal treats the opening of clusters as a “procedural step”, reducing the political discretion of member states. This distinction matters because it detaches technical preparedness from the broader political assessment of the fundamentals, contradicting the logic of the 2020 revised methodology. While such an approach could help limit arbitrary member-state vetoes, it also risks sidelining the rule of law if the Commission’s assessment is narrowed to technical readiness.
In this context, Serbia’s timely reversal has been regarded as a positive step that justifies allowing the country to advance. The European Commission reacted quickly, announcing that it was “looking for ways to incentivise Belgrade to continue reforms”. Only a few days later, the EU executive sent a letter to member states ahead of an ambassadors’ meeting on July 8 arguing why the judicial reform reversal justifies opening Cluster 3.
But the EU should not reward Belgrade for stepping back from a crisis it created. Doing so risks perpetuating the EU’s inconsistent application of conditionality in the Western Balkans.
First, it would reward tactical compliance rather than genuine reform. Reversing legislation that undermined judicial independence is not progress, but an exercise in testing the red lines. Nor does it demonstrate commitment to the EU path. While Vučić wants to appear constructive before EU stakeholders, his rhetoric at home remains belligerent towards the EU and friendly towards Russia. Rewarding this behaviour would entrench the SNS’s old pattern: create a crisis, then extract concessions for de-escalating it.
Second, opening Cluster 3 after this decision was held back on rule of law grounds would validate Serbia’s current performance on the fundamentals. It would legitimise the government’s continued deterioration of democratic standards and ongoing repression. The signal would be clear: democratic backsliding carries little practical cost.
Third, it would weaken the credibility of conditionality for other enlargement countries, disincentivising reforms elsewhere and fuelling narratives about Brussels’ double standards. A political override of the merit-based logic would also create the perception that the process is externally driven, not domestically owned. This would weaken both the agency and responsibility of candidate-country authorities.
Fourth, it would weaken political support for enlargement inside the EU. Concerns about rule of law remain a central source of scepticism among member states. Pushing forward the bid of a candidate with serious democratic shortcomings would only increase member states’ hesitation.
The accession process was designed as a vehicle for democratic consolidation in the Western Balkans. Over time, however, the EU has applied conditionality inconsistently: in some cases, by backtracking on requirements or overlooking rule of law backsliding, in others, by failing to deliver when candidates had done their homework due to individual member-state vetoes. This inconsistency spoils the engine of enlargement. If conditionality is not applied consistently, it becomes political bargaining and a tool for legitimising undemocratic governance.
Some voices within the EU believe that enlargement needs new dynamism and that candidate countries need stronger incentives. The EU is free to make geopolitical choices. What it cannot afford is to present political expediency as merit-based enlargement. If member states decide to open Cluster 3 for geopolitical reasons or to give new impetus to enlargement, they should say so openly. The decision should be communicated as a political choice intended for the good of the Serbian citizens, not as proof of reform success by the government. It should also be paired with an explicit assertion of Serbia’s shortcomings on the fundamentals and a clear list of pending reforms.
To get back on the EU track, Serbia requires a comprehensive and genuine democratic transformation, not tactical cosmetic tweaks.
Berta López Domènech is a Policy Analyst in the European Politics and Institutions Programme at the European Policy Centre.
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