On 4 November, the European Commission published its Enlargement Package. For North Macedonia, a candidate country since 2005, it was just one more annual assessment of its progress. Twenty reports later, the technical language of progress and preparedness has lost most of its readers.

This year, the report noted progress in the judiciary, a roadmap on public administration reform and an enabling environment for civil society. The country has also advanced under the Reform and Growth Facility (RGF) and remains fully aligned with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Yet four years after negotiations formally began, not a single cluster has been opened. This is the accession paradox of North Macedonia: a country moving forward on two tracks, yet still unable to open negotiating clusters. Two separate problems explain this. The reform record is uneven, with headway under the RGF but weak results in key fundamentals. The political blockage sits elsewhere, in the constitutional amendments required to open the first cluster.

Progress outside the clusters

By June 2026, the EU had released €142.1 million (including pre-financing) of the indicative maximum allocation of €750.4 million, based on 22 of the 53 reform steps due in the first three reporting periods. The fundamentals, which set the pace of accession, tell a different story, with no progress in the fight against corruption, which the Commission calls “an issue of serious concern”, and none on freedom of expression.

Both processes cover the rule of law, but they do not always measure the same thing. Meeting an individual RGF milestone does not necessarily demonstrate the broader operational capacity assessed in the accession report. The Agency for Management of Confiscated Property illustrates this. It filled all the envisaged vacancies in June 2026, as it committed to do under the Reform Agenda, yet the report notes it still lacks the funds, storage and equipment to do its work.

Full CFSP alignment brings some benefits, such as support under the European Peace Facility, but limited influence over how EU policy is formed. Gradual integration could change this, through observer status in the Council’s CFSP working parties and participation in EU defence initiatives – as a step towards membership, not a substitute for it. This could sustain reforms and bring citizens tangible benefits in the meantime, but it also risks making a prolonged deadlock more politically tolerable.

Constitutional amendments: From a bilateral issue to an EU condition

Neither reforms nor CFSP alignment can open the first cluster while the constitutional condition remains outstanding. The Council conclusions of July 2022 made Bulgaria’s demand an EU condition: amending the Constitution to include Bulgarians among the communities it recognises.

The dialogue between the two countries has stalled. Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski has proposed adopting the amendments now, with entry into force only once North Macedonia joins the EU. In October 2026, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova described as “unacceptable” both deferred effect amendments and rejected any renegotiation. The report notes there has been no attempt to adopt the amendments and no tangible results from the joint commission on historical and educational issues.

Any breakthrough would need broad public support, or it could deepen polarisation in an already divided society. According to the 2025 IDSCS survey on EU accession, only 24% of citizens saw the constitutional changes as the next step in the EU accession process, with 57% of ethnic Albanians and 11% of ethnic Macedonians in favour.

After the constitutional changes: A new veto?

Even after the amendments, Skopje fears new demands would follow, as the veto has been used far too often in the accession process. In June 2025, Sofia reiterated that Bulgaria had no additional conditions beyond those defined in the agreed European consensus. The challenge is to make the scope of those commitments – and the steps following their fulfilment – clear and predictable. Croatia’s current demands on Montenegro will test whether such disputes can be managed without stalling a candidate. Three things would reduce the risk: (1) a clear account of the procedural steps once the conditions are met; (2) political commitments from member states against additional bilateral demands; and (3) a practical mechanism for managing disputes before they block negotiations.

Breaking the deadlock

A solution between Skopje and Sofia seems unlikely without the EU, who should make concrete their offer of help. A dedicated EU envoy could facilitate dialogue while the Commission sets out in writing the steps that would follow the amendments. The EU should also support an inclusive public debate on the amendments to address identity concerns directly.

The RGF already ties payments to rule-of-law preconditions and reform steps. Future rule-of-law milestones should place greater emphasis on operational capacity and demonstrable results, aligned with the roadmaps for the fundamental cluster. Meanwhile, the government should keep reforms in the fundamentals moving regardless of the amendments.

The real risk is that North Macedonia could fall further behind as other candidates advance. Prolonged deadlock could weaken both domestic incentives for reform and confidence across the region that meeting agreed conditions will bring accession closer. The country could lose another two decades and gain 20 more reports with no substantial impact on its citizens.

Anamarija Velinovska is a Connecting Europe Fellow at the EPC.

The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.