

Confronting the permacrisis: Time for a supra- governmental avantgarde

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Table of contents

Executive summary	3
An era shattered by the permacrisis	4
Global instability	4
The decline of the ‘old West’	5
The cost of failure	5
Learning from the EU’s experience	6
A renewed EU: embracing differentiation	7
Endnotes	10

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Executive summary

As the EU27 enter a new politico-institutional cycle, the tasks and obstacles ahead look daunting. Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine, and the EU will be confronted with an aggressive Moscow for years to come. The list of interrelated crises is ever extending, accompanied by fundamental transformations of Europe's societies, driven by climate change and the loss of biodiversity, demography and ageing, and global technological revolutions. The 'old West' is suffering from increasing political fragmentation and polarisation, amounting to a clear danger for pluralist, liberal democracies.

Yet, the multiple challenges linked to the European and global *Zeitenwende* should not be taken as an excuse for despair, introspection, inertia, and inaction but function as a rallying call: it is a moral imperative that we do all we can to change potential dismal outcomes for future generations.

But faced with the permacrisis and increasing domestic political challenges, the strategic willingness to pool sovereignty at the EU level and abide by common decisions has come increasingly under pressure. The recent results of the 2024 European elections have cemented this trend. In this situation, Europe requires a bold assessment of where it stands, a compass on where it wants to be, and a realistic but also ambitious plan how to achieve its goals. As the new EU leadership is getting off ground, the political centre must boldly use its majority in the EU institutions to promote more ambitious strategic objectives. If the pro-European mainstream will not do so, the political fringes will continue to grow.

But what to do if some EU governments can, and are willing to, block progress within the Union? If agreement cannot be found within the existing EU framework, an alternative route needs to be explored. The countries that are ready to deepen their level of cooperation should do so, even if parallel avenues extend beyond the narrow legal confines of the current EU treaties, as was done in the case of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the Fiscal Compact. This process should follow the

notion of a 'supra-governmental avantgarde' allowing the willing member states to progress, while adhering to a set of predefined principles. It must be clear that this avantgarde is not an inter-governmental construct, but rather something like a 'mini-EU' with binding rules, strong supranational features and an (enhanced) involvement of EU institutions.

In more concrete terms, there is a need to forcefully progress in the area of defence. Willing EU countries should be ready to jointly and massively invest into European defence cooperation, financially supported by targeted joint and common borrowing mechanisms. Calls for leadership are usually directed to Berlin and Paris. Yet, at this stage, the Franco-German engine is politically weak, given internal divisions in both countries. Therefore, eyes should increasingly be on Poland (that will assume the EU Council presidency in January 2025) and other EU countries as potential anchors, promoters and drivers for a supra-governmental avantgarde in European defence.

For good reasons, the EU and its members have since the beginning of the permacrisis avoided major forms of differentiated integration in key policy areas. But given the European and global *Zeitenwende* we are experiencing, the risks of a more differentiated Europe are outweighed by the urgent need to overcome blockades and strengthen Europe's capacity to act. Conversely, if we sacrifice the necessary level of ambition for the sake of unity, we run the danger of continued underdelivery, which in return will further undermine the Union's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and play into the hands of those who want to radically downscale the level of European integration. So, even if a fundamental higher level of differentiation in the context of a 'supra-governmental avantgarde' entails some dangers and will be politically difficult to materialise, it is the radical change that Europe requires. Alternatively, there is a real risk that the Union as we know it will unravel.

An era shattered by the permacrisis

As the European Union (EU) and its member states enter a new politico-institutional cycle for the next five years (2024-2029), the tasks and obstacles ahead look daunting in this new era. Yet, these fundamental challenges should not be taken as an excuse for despair, introspection, inertia, and inaction but function as a rallying call: it is a moral imperative that we do all we can to change potential dismal outcomes for future generations.¹

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Europe has been operating under the conditions of a permacrisis² for more than 15 years, aggravated by the watershed moment of Russia's invasion of Ukraine³ that requires a much greater focus on security and defence. The list of interrelated crises is ever extending, accompanied by necessary and fundamental transformations of Europe's societies, driven by climate change and the loss of biodiversity, demography and ageing, and global technological revolutions. Europe's competitiveness is under increasing pressure, while perceived and real inequalities and lack of agency are having political consequences on several crucial elections at the European and global level. Europe and the Western world in general are suffering from increasing fragmentation and polarisation, amounting to a danger for pluralist, liberal democracies.

This European and global *Zeitenwende*⁴ is being felt acutely by Europeans, coming after a long period of relative stability and prosperity for many citizens, and extending to most of Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. For decades, Europe was able to isolate and shield itself from negative global trends, focusing on making economic progress within a broad centrist political consensus. This era has been shattered by the permacrisis, amounting to a fundamental challenge for the EU and our democratic institutions. So, how can the Union and our liberal pluralist democracies prove that they can work not only when times are good, but also when times are bad? And how can we continue to succeed in making the case for EUrope to its citizens in the years to come?

Global instability

Arguably, (Western) Europe's experience in recent history has been anomalous, both compared to its dark and bloody history before the 1950s and compared to the rest of the world, not least because of the undeniable successes of the European integration project. In other parts of the world, the four horsemen of the apocalypse⁵ – pestilence, hunger, war and death – have been ever present, and many countries and regions have experienced political upheavals and long periods of despair, socially, politically and economically.

In recent years, the world has witnessed a plethora of fundamental crises and challenges, including, but not limited to, the pandemic, transformative megatrends, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which has undermined core principles of international law, and the watershed moment surrounding the conflict in Gaza.

These crises and challenges are all taking place within the context of global instability, fragmentation and polarisation, with war as a means of politics returning and 'my country first' becoming a strong political feature in many parts of the world, despite the need to tackle the common global challenges we face.

Yet, at the same time, there is also tremendous energy and appetite for positive change – something which is often overlooked in a European/Western centred perspective on global developments. This comes with an opportunity for EUrope, which for too long has seen itself as being the role model for advancing stability and prosperity and is now struggling to adapt to the new global geopolitical and geo-economic realities.

The decline of the ‘old West’

For the time being, **Europe and the rest of the world have entered an ‘age of permopolycrisis’ characterised by the permanence of numerous interrelated, at times parallel fundamental crises and transformations**, which have led to a severe blockage when it comes to jointly resolving common global challenges. This new age is in part caused by the weakening of the post-World War II global governance mechanisms, while in turn accelerating the decline of the ‘old West’.

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The deterioration of the Western rules-based multilateral order has been ongoing for some time, in particular caused by both global superpowers, the United States and China, being increasingly unsupportive of existing institutions. In parallel, the ‘Global South’ has rightly criticised the system as being too exclusive and the Gaza conflict has further aggravated views that

see global multilateral rules as ineffective, only being applied by ‘the West’ if they serve themselves. It has also shown that rules that are not enforced, at the end of the day, undermine the entire system.

European politicians are rightly making speeches supporting a rules-based international order, but their voices sound increasingly hollow, powerless, and hypocritical. Europe today is suffering from an abundance of articulated values contrasted with a lack of performance and credibility. This undermines any attempts to engage with the ‘Global South’ in a meaningful way, at both the EU and national level.

While it is true that there is a trend towards global multipolarity, this has not led to a reinvigorated support for inclusive forms of multilateralism. On the contrary, the slow demise of the Western dominated rules-based order is leading towards a world without any rules, implying chaos and a ‘might-is-right’ approach to international political and economic relations. This approach is undermining the effective enforcement of any rules, fundamentally hindering global cooperation, and development (see also below). In this context, the superpowers still matter, but they might well polarise in this multipolar world, leading to opposing camps, with a detrimental effect on global development and a failure to address global commons, especially in a world where international growth engines like trade and investment are less effective without a functioning rules-based framework, such as the WTO.

The cost of failure

It is hard to see how the world can overcome its current progress illusion⁶ and adequately address the scale and scope of the fundamental challenges, including climate change, without a functioning mechanism of global multilateral cooperation.

Equally, the economic development of a growing world population will not be achievable in a world that is not pursuing common goals. Of course, climate change and a lack of development will only further accelerate the permopolycrisis, thereby creating a downward spiral, further feeding conflict and division.

A continuation of this spiral will undoubtedly result in increasing uncertainty, instability, and conflict for the entire world population. A new Cold War remains a distinct possibility, alongside numerous intractable conflicts in different parts of the world, which will constantly carry the risk of escalation. There is likely to be a proliferation of nuclear weapons, given the

perceived need for countries to protect themselves in a more hostile and uncertain world, especially if Ukraine loses the war, given that Kyiv voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons in the past.

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But while in Europe increasingly lip service has been paid to the fundamental nature of the global challenges of the new era, actions are still falling far behind what is needed. This is, to a large extent, because the world (including Europe) is suffering from a collective progress illusion, where the actions taken are nowhere near addressing the scale and scope of the fundamental challenges. In other words, while the world is facing exponential challenges, the EU and the global system are trying to respond with linear solutions.

In this global context, **Europe's ability to act needs to be strengthened urgently if the 'old continent' wants to counter security threats in its neighbourhood**

Learning from the EU's experience

Much can be taken from the European experience since the 1950s, both in its successes and from some of its malfunctions in recent times. The European project has never been perfect, but it remains the most successful example of integration when it comes to overcoming deep-seated divisions and conflict by creating enforceable multilateral rules enforced by a complex system of multilevel governance. This is an unprecedented historical achievement that should not be jeopardised by taking it for granted.

However, in recent years, the ability of the EU to structurally develop further has come under pressure, particularly due to the manifold challenges related to the different chapters of the permacrisis. As a result, it has become fashionable to dismiss the Union's model of governance. While parties on the extreme ends of the political spectrum have made this a core selling point of their simplistic narrative – with increasing successes in many EU countries, and growing representation in the European Parliament – it is worrying that this trend has also crept more widely into Europe's political discourse, reaching many parts of the political mainstream. This has severely damaged the EU and its prospects. **The only way to heal this damage is to openly address the Union's fundamental problems by applying brutal honesty,⁷ and then build constructive majorities to mend them.**

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and influence the elaboration of more effective mechanisms of global cooperation. But recent election results – both at the EU and national level – suggest that we are entering a period of cautious political manoeuvring, characterised by a lack of leadership. Such a cautious approach will, however, not suffice. Europe's geography, its outward looking trading power and the diversity of its societies suggest that the EU will not be able to hide away from the outside. So, rather than hoping for the worst to be avoided, and trying to muddle through, the EU27 need to mobilise their potential more strategically to prevent more scenarios of regional and global conflict in the coming years. But how can the EU and its members progress and what lessons should history teach us?

What has made the EU system work and why is it increasingly under pressure? At the heart of the Union lies a confederation of member states, that has given itself a supranational and enforceable legal framework to govern common policies in predefined areas. This entails proactively pooling sovereignty and accepting that common decisions will not fully reflect narrow national interests, but that there are broader positive benefits that accrue from having a functioning operating system. By focusing on ambitious integration steps with concrete benefits, such as the creation of the Single Market, Schengen or the common currency, political objections and national sovereignty reflexes were often overcome to the benefit of all.

However, during the last 20 years, the EU and its members have gradually abandoned this successful path. **Facing the permacrisis and increasing domestic political challenges, the strategic willingness to pool sovereignty and abide by common decisions has come increasingly under pressure.** The recent results of the 2024 European elections have cemented this trend, and **at the level of national governments one can hardly find leaders who today are willing to invest sufficient political capital into substantially strengthening and deepening cooperation at the European level.** In many ways, this relates to the circumstance that rather than sharing the benefits of integration, the EU27 now have to distribute costs, albeit arguably lower total costs than those that would have to be borne by countries acting on their own, which is politically a far more challenging proposition.

In the case of one country, the UK, 'sovereignty' has been prioritised over integration despite the undeniable economic and political costs that imposes. But this does not imply that the EU will crumble, because other member states are ready to follow into the UK's footsteps. Brexit has shown that leaving the EU does not offer the solution. On the contrary, the number of aspirants that are queuing up to join the club has grown, including now not 'only' the countries of the Western

Balkans but also Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Despite its shortcomings, the Union remains attractive and a crucial instrument for Europe to react to transboundary challenges, within an increasingly challenging regional and global geopolitical and geo-economic environment. After 1989/90, **enlargement has once again become a geopolitical imperative and the Union should prepare for it, even if one cannot, at this point in time, predict when, how and under which conditions an EU widening will materialise.** This is in the interest of both the Union and those who aspire to join the club.

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No doubt, the EU and its members have been able to react to multiple crises over the past two decades when their backs have been against the wall. In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the EU27 have acted more decisively, more united and faster than in any other crisis since 2007. But although the Union and its members reacted more assertively than many expected, this is no time for self-congratulation.⁸ On the contrary, the EU27 must do more in response to the tectonic shifts that we are witnessing in Europe's neighbourhood and at the global level.

A renewed EU – embracing differentiation

The way ahead is not about the false choice between incremental or radical change. At this point, change in the context of the evolving global permapolycrisis will inevitably be radical, whether it is piecemeal or wholesale, and the focus should be on the need to adapt as if our survival depends on it – because it does.¹¹ But so far, when it comes to setting long-term objectives and taking bold decisions, the EU has been unable to proactively move forward. In an ideal world, there would be a transboundary, honest strategic exchange leading to a shared vision among the EU27 of what needs to be done, incorporating and closely coordinating actions at both the national and European level.

However, experience – including the 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda adopted by the European Council in June 2024 – shows that **the EU and its members struggle to define**

It would be dangerous to trust that the 'crisis automatism' witnessed in previous chapters of the permacrisis will always work in the future. And it would be naïve to take for granted that the EU and its members will always do what is required when the pressure is so high that the Union has no choice but to go the extra mile to avoid the situation spiralling out of control. One cannot exclude that the EU27 might in future fail to step back from potential cliffs, especially if EU-critical political forces assume (more) power at the national level, including in key EU countries like France, Italy or the Netherlands.⁹

As the new EU leadership is getting off the ground after the 2024 European elections, **the political centre should boldly use its majority in the EU institutions to promote more ambitious strategic objectives in the coming years. If the pro-European mainstream will not do so, the political fringes will continue to grow.** Much more than in the past, the EU and member states must resist the temptation to merely focus on keeping the machinery afloat. But rather than witnessing a forward-looking strategic agenda, we run the risk of experiencing more of a reactive muddling-through¹⁰ that will not address the severe gravity of the fundamental challenges that we are facing, individually and collectively.

While the recent European election results, and the mood in key member states suggest a lack of political courage to move decisively forward, we actually need the opposite. **Europe requires a bold assessment of where it stands ('brutal honesty'), a compass on where it wants to be, and a realistic but also ambitious plan how to achieve its goals, even if not all governments are ready to support a major qualitative leap.**

and agree on an ambitious joint strategic vision, let alone a concrete strategic plan, given major differences between member states (governments) on core strategic issues and questions.¹² EU countries and institutions have not conducted a realistic assessment of what has or has not worked, and whether we have individually and collectively reached the point where we need to be at this moment in time. Given the tectonic shifts we are witnessing, there is a need to be more ambitious, even if this does not involve all member states.

But thus far, the EU27 are not collectively ready and/or able to define core strategic priorities and radically upscale their readiness to deepen cooperation at the European level, especially when it comes to deepening defence cooperation or substantially increasing spending at the European level. Also, when it comes to reforming

decision-making in the (European) Council or when it comes to preparing for major global risks, such as a second Trump Presidency, which would be a far greater challenge than his first time in office. All too often, ambition and concreteness are sacrificed to the need to preserve unity.¹³

To strengthen the Union's capacity to implement its strategic objectives, the EU and its institutions will have to act more like a government than a legislative machine. This implies that the EU has the agency to act in politically more contentious fields like foreign, security and defence policy. This implies a greater pooling and sharing of sovereignty than ever before. However, the risk is that the ambition-unity dilemma¹⁴ will increasingly block further action. In addition, enforceability is a far greater challenge when it comes to common decisions rather than legal acts, as this implies that the EU institutions also have the policy means and mechanisms at their disposal, for example, in budgetary terms.

It is difficult to see how this will be possible with all EU countries involved. In theory, groups of countries could move forward by using the mechanisms of differentiated integration available in the Lisbon Treaty, including the instrument of enhanced cooperation (Article 20 Treaty on the European Union (TEU)) or permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) (Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU). However, experience has shown that member states are reluctant to use existing mechanisms/instruments, given that their application is rather complex in practice and on many occasions also reaches legal limits, especially if they touch on areas where EU legal norms apply to all member states, for example on Single Market issues.¹⁵

So, if agreement cannot be found within the EU framework, given that governments of certain member states block progress within the Union, an alternative route needs to be found, allowing cooperation outside but in parallel to the EU treaties. In those cases, progress will have to rely on coalitions of those who are ready to create parallel avenues allowing and promoting systemic cooperation and integration in specific policy areas, even if they are not fully integrated and governed by the mechanisms of the EU. Something similar was already done in the past in the case of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the Fiscal Compact (enshrined in the "Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union"), which excludes those member states that choose not to participate or support a common approach.¹⁶

If agreement cannot be found within the EU framework, given that governments of certain member states block progress within the Union, an alternative route needs to be found, allowing cooperation outside but in parallel to the EU treaties.

If a group of EU countries is ready to progress against the opposition of a limited number of national governments and can only do so outside the Union, this **process should follow the notion of a 'supra-governmental avantgarde', allowing the willing member states to extend the level of cooperation/integration outside the EU treaty framework, while adhering to a transparent set of predefined principles, including the commitment to 'replicate', respect and promote the Union's supranational nature.** It must be clear that this Avantgarde is not an inter-governmental construct – even if it is established outside the EU treaties – but that it is rather something like a 'mini-EU' with binding rules and strong supranational features, including the specific role and involvement of EU institutions.

In more concrete terms, such a supra-governmental avantgarde should therefore:

- (1) Be open to all member states willing to join and respect common underlying principles;
- (2) Involve or even strengthen the role of EU institutions in the differentiated areas, including the Commission and the European Parliament;
- (3) Keep non-participating member states informed;
- (4) Refrain from setting up new permanent parallel institutional structures outside the Union;
- (5) Aim to integrate the legal norms adopted and the cooperation initiated outside the EU into the Union's treaty framework as soon as possible.

If the participating member states adhere to these core guidelines, they would not 'only' be able to move forward, they could also do so in a way that would respect the community method.

The formation of coalitions of the willing will create club goods rather than public goods, having a demonstrable outsider/insider effect. There is a good chance that such a forward-moving avantgarde will create a centripetal momentum for countries to join in, to also benefit from the club goods being created. However, the big danger remains that countries free ride. **Any structures created in the context of a supra-governmental avantgarde will thus also require a forced expulsion mechanism, which can be applied to any participating country when it no longer follows or even undermines the common strategic direction and underlying principles.**

To be frank, cooperation outside the Union's framework will create challenges for the EU system, in terms of legitimacy but also in challenging existing areas of integration, for example, by funding no longer being channelled through the Union. It carries the risk of undermining the EU Single Market, the backbone of the EU, and it could play into the hands of political forces on the far-right and -left, who want to actively undermine

EU institutions to establish a “Europe of nation states”. However, at this point, **the risks of a more differentiated EU are outweighed by the urgent need to overcome blockades and preserve Europe’s capacity to act.**

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But in which policy areas would it make sense to move forward via the creation of a supra-governmental avantgarde? **Most urgently, there is a need to progress forcefully in the area of defence.** EUrope needs to be prepared to take more responsibility for its security, regardless of whether Donald Trump returns to the White House in January 2025. The EU27 will have to live with an aggressive Russia for years to come. And it is unlikely that any future US President will continue to extend resources to defend Europe, especially if Washington decides to engage itself in (potential) conflicts in other parts of the world, particularly in Asia, or descends into isolationism.

Based on the realisation that the enhancement of EUrope’s defence capabilities/capacities is a common European good that needs to be ambitiously pursued, **willing member states should be ready to jointly and massively invest into European defence cooperation, financially supported by targeted joint and common borrowing mechanisms.** The current level of collective spending in the area of defence is by far not sufficient. Bearing in mind constitutional concerns in a number of member states (notably also in Germany) and following the model pursued in the context of NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the money raised would have to be *ad hoc*, target specific objectives (like, for example, a common defence shield), and be collectively financed from outside the traditional Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

Calls for leadership and initiative are usually being directed to Berlin and Paris. Yet, at this stage, the Franco-German engine is politically weak. Therefore, **eyes should increasingly be on Poland (which will assume the EU Council presidency in January 2025) and other EU countries as potential anchors, promoters and drivers for an avantgarde in European defence.** The deep concerns (and early warnings) of EU members of the Eastern flank regarding

Russia’s aggressive neo-imperialism will make these countries likely to be interested in further steps to strengthen European defence, albeit strongly aligned with their objectives within NATO. And there is also an opportunity to engage non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom and Norway in such a process. Needless to say, such an exercise of countries taking the lead must always aim at bringing in the many, if they are ambitious enough, not the few, to have a meaningful impact. As such, the creation of a supra-governmental avantgarde should and will also put pressure on Berlin and Paris to be on board.

For good reasons, the EU and its members have, in recent decades, avoided major forms of differentiated integration in key policy areas. One can argue that such radical forms of differentiation could be dangerous for the Union’s overall future, as it might undermine unity, cause distrust between the ‘outs’ and ‘ins’, erode the EU’s institutions and, thus, entail the danger of potentially creating new divides in Europe.¹⁷

These concerns are indeed valid. But the radical change that EUrope is confronted with both from the outside as well as from the inside requires a re-evaluation and re-thinking of old recipes. Given the European and global *Zeitenwende* we are experiencing, a higher level of ambition is indispensable, even if this means that not all member states will always be on board and that cooperation, at times, might have to be organised outside the EU treaties. Conversely, if we sacrifice the necessary level of ambition for the sake of unity, EUrope runs the danger of continued underdelivery, which in return will further undermine the Union’s legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and play into the hands of those who want to radically downscale the level of European integration. So, **even if a fundamental higher level of differentiation in the context of a supra-governmental avantgarde entails some dangers and will be politically difficult to materialise, it is the radical change that we require. Alternatively, there is a real risk that the Union as we know it will unravel.**

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- ¹ See Emmanouilidis, Janis A. and Zuleeg, Fabian (2024), "Eight structural innovations for the EU's next politico-institutional cycle", *EPC Discussion Paper*; here p. 6. Download available at: <https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Eight-structural-innovations-for-the-EUs-next-politicoinstitutional-c-5c0e68>.
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- ³ See Zuleeg, Fabian (2022), "A watershed moment in European history: decision time for the EU", *EPC Commentary*. Download available at: <https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/A-watershed-moment-in-European-history-Decision-time-for-the-EU-4628f0>.
- ⁴ See Zuleeg, Fabian and Emmanouilidis, Janis A. (2022), "Europe's moment of truth: United by adversity?", *EPC Discussion Paper*. Download available at: https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/Europes_moment_of_truth_DP.pdf.
- ⁵ The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse are figures in the Book of Revelation in the New Testament of the Bible, a piece of apocalypse literature attributed to John of Patmos.
- ⁶ See Emmanouilidis and Zuleeg, "Eight structural innovations for the EU's next politico-institutional cycle", *op. cit*; and Zuleeg, Fabian (2023), "Overcoming the European Progress Illusion", *EPC Commentary*. Download available at: <https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Overcoming-the-European-Progress-Illusion-505c44>.
- ⁷ See Emmanouilidis and Zuleeg, "Eight structural innovations for the EU's next politico-institutional cycle", *op. cit*; here p. 5.
- ⁸ See Zuleeg and Emmanouilidis, "Europe's moment of truth: United by adversity?", *op. cit*.
- ⁹ See Emmanouilidis, Janis A. and Stratulat, Corina (2024), "Participatory democracy at the EU level: How to break the invisible ceiling", *Observatory Report* published in the context of the EU Democracy Reform Observatory. Download available at: https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2024/Participatory_Democracy_paper_v4.pdf.
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- ¹¹ See Emmanouilidis and Stratulat "Participatory democracy at the EU level: How to break the invisible ceiling", *op. cit*.
- ¹² For a list of core strategic issues and questions where EU member states differ see: Emmanouilidis and Zuleeg, "Eight structural innovations for the EU's next politico-institutional cycle", *op. cit*; here p. 11.
- ¹³ See Emmanouilidis, Janis A. and Zuleeg, Fabian (2022), "Overcoming the ambition-unity dilemma", *EPC Discussion Paper*. Download available at: https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/Overcoming_the_ambition_unity_dilemma_DP.pdf.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid*.
- ¹⁵ See Emmanouilidis and Zuleeg, "Eight structural innovations for the EU's next politico-institutional cycle", *op. cit*; here p. 10.
- ¹⁶ See Emmanouilidis, Janis A. (2012), "Which Lessons to Draw from the Past and Current Use of Differentiated Integration?", in European Parliament, DG Internal Policies (ed.), *Challenges of Multi-Tier Governance in the European Union – Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy*, pp. 62-77; here pp. 68-70 & 74. Download available here: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474438/IPOL-AFCO_ET\(2013\)474438_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474438/IPOL-AFCO_ET(2013)474438_EN.pdf).
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